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FOREWORD 
This Research for Action study on the Emergence of Unorthodox Ownership and 
Governance Structures in East Asia: An Alternative Transition Path is the continuation 
of UNU/WIDER's research on the economics of transition started in the early 1990s and 
expanded substantially since 1996. UNU/WIDER is currently doing three major projects 
on transition economies. 
The first project - Economic Shocks, Social Stress and the Demographic Impact of 
Sudden Impoverishment - seeks to explain the recent unfavourable fertility and 
mortality changes observed in economies (mostly in Eastern Europe and former Soviet 
republics, but also elsewhere) hit by sudden economic shocks and mounting uncertainty. 
Our second project - Poverty, Income Distribution and Well-Being in Asia during 
Transition - focuses on the social consequences of reform in two different groups of 
Asian transition economies: i) the former Soviet Central Asian republics and Mongolia, 
and ii) China, Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Kampuchea. The third project - Transition 
Strategies: Alternatives and Outcomes - is aimed at comparing different models of 
transition observed so far in East European countries, the former Soviet Union, China, 
Mongolia and Vietnam. The emphasis of this project is not only on strategies of 
transition (shock therapy versus gradual reforms, etc.) but also on the outcomes of the 
process: we try to establish what market stereotypes are emerging in the post-socialist 
world (income and asset distribution, the role of the state, industrial structure and 
international trade specialization) and what patterns of long-term development will 
prevail in these countries in future. 
As part of the third research project, Laixiang Sun's paper on the Emergence of 
Unorthodox Ownership and Governance Structures in East Asia examines recent 
patterns of development of ownership, control and governance in the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and township and village enterprises (TVEs) in China and Vietnam. 
The importance of the topic is highlighted by the fact that there is an obvious gap 
between the orthodox property rights theory (clearly and legally enforceable property 
rights of firms are the basic precondition of efficiency and the proper functioning of the 
market economy) and the transition experience of China and Vietnam. Not only 
township and village enterprises with unclear ownership and control patterns had 
unprecedented success and became the driving force of economic growth, but even more 
mysteriously, state-owned enterprises - including large ones - demonstrated high 
efficiency and growth rates. 
Treating ownership as a bundle of rights, the author makes highly instructive and 
illuminating comparisons between various types of SOEs (with management contracts, 
leasing contracts, and employee stock ownership), joint ventures, TVEs, and private 
firms in order to find out who is de facto making decisions in specific areas, how profits 
are being distributed, what are the budget constraints and bankruptcy provisions, and 
who is the 'lender of the last resort'. It is shown that the performance of different 
v 
business entities depends mostly not on the formal ownership and control, but rather on 
the incentive structure and type of budget constraints, which is consistent with outcomes 
of the studies on Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics, namely with 
the study by Derek C. Jones on The Determinants of Economic Performance in 
Transitional Economies: The Role of Ownership, Incentives and Restructuring, which is 
being published by UNU/WIDER simultaneously with this paper. 
I warmly recommend the reading of this study to academics, policy makers and 
professionals interested in the well-being and future of transition economies. 
Giovanni Andrea Cornia 
Director, UNU/WIDER 
July 1997 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the nature of the unorthodox ownership and governance structures 
that are emerging among firms and the way these structures are supporting the 
remarkable economic growth in the transition economies of East Asia, as represented in 
particular by China and Vietnam. These economies are embarked on a distinctive 
process of property rights reform that resists widespread privatization in favour of 
evolutionary transformation. From the perspective that organizational innovation is an 
adaptive recombination and ownership is a bundle of rights, this paper focuses on an 
evaluation of the extent and consistency of property rights reform in the state-owned 
enterprise sector of these economies. It reveals the features of the ownership and 
governance structures of Chinese township-village-enterprises and their consequences 
for liability and incentives and justifies the fact that private entrepreneurs are typically 
willing to include community authority as an ambiguous owner or shelter within the 
embrace of state-owned enterprises. The paper also explores the conditions which have 
motivated the reform, the impact of property rights structure and reform on enterprise 
performance, and the relationship between adaptability and accountability. 
viii 
I INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the nature of the unorthodox ownership and governance structures 
which are emerging among firms and the way these structures are supporting the 
remarkable economic growth in the transition economies of East Asia, as represented in 
particular by China and Vietnam. These economies are embarked on a distinctive 
process of property rights reform that resists widespread privatization in favour of 
evolutionary transformation. 
Following a brief description of the 'ownership puzzle' in transition economies, this 
paper provides a general framework for understanding property rights reform in the 
transition economies of East Asia (Section II). This covers issues such as the 
evolutionary perspective of organizations from Schumpeter to Williamson, property 
rights as a bundle of rights and the values of the soft-budget constraint perceived by 
various state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Section III examines the reform of property 
rights in the SOE sector in China, Vietnam and Laos and evaluates the impact of the 
reform on the performance of state-owned enterprises. Section IV describes the features 
of the ownership and governance structures of township and village enterprises in China 
and analyses the importance of these features for liability and incentives. Section V 
examines the ambiguities of property rights arrangements among private enterprises in 
these economies and outlines the comparative benefits and costs. Section VI presents a 
summary of the features of heterodox ownership and governance structures and then 
explores the distinction between 'ownership of the asset' and 'ownership of the firm', as 
well as the view that the latter is 'state-contingent ownership'. 
1.1 The ownership puzzle in post-privatization economies 
The privatization approach was one of the earliest consensus views on the 
postcommunist transition and has been a central feature of the transition in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. This common sense view is believed in theoretical 
terms to possess the self-evidence which comes from the orthodox property rights 
theory. The existence of well-defined private property rights is a basic precondition for 
the proper functioning of a market economy.1 As a corollary, the creation of clear and 
legally enforceable private property rights for firms is seen as the only way to remedy 
the problems associated with the soft-budget constraint and bureaucratic bargaining 
prevailing in the state-owned sector. The most compelling practical reason for the 
1
 As Weitzman and Xu (1994) have pointed out, 'there is no single universally accepted statement of so-
called property right theory. Most presentations of the theory are essentially verbal expositions 
representing a combination of philosophical thinking, empirical generalization, and reasoned theoretical 
assertion'. Alchian (1974), the founding father of the new property rights approach, also indicated that 
perceiving private property rights as the precondition of a well-functioning market economy is a belief or 
a proposition which is 'not yet derivable from economic theory nor fully validated by sufficient evidence' 
(page xiii). 
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privatization of state-owned enterprises is the long-lasting inefficiency of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) as a whole. By creating property owners, privatization is thus 
perceived as the most direct avenue for unlocking gains in economic efficiency by the 
placement of property under the exclusive control of private owners who are seen to be 
liable for the consequences of bad decisions, but entitled to the rewards of goods ones 
and willing to offer greater motivation for both managers and workers. 
After seven years of great sacrifice along with the transition, it is now widely 
acknowledged that the privatization process has turned out to be much more difficult 
and costly than expected. Furthermore, the key outcome, the post-privatization 
ownership structure, has also become quite complicated and is far from having 
developed clear and legally enforceable private property rights. On the one hand, the 
privatization of former SOEs has led to a complex ownership structure involving banks, 
investment funds, other enterprises, state asset management agencies, and local 
governments in a network of cross-ownership. The resultant governance structure is 
characterized by insider control, representing a general strengthening of the managerial 
classes in nearly all these postcommunist countries. On the other hand, many of the 
emerging private firms are turning to the state for all kinds of financial 'rents'. Subsidies, 
tariff protection, legal monopolies, and redistributional regulations are still prevailing 
even where direct state ownership has become rare (cf., among others, Brada 1996; 
Frydman et al. 1996; Lavigne 1995; Stark 1996). Together, these indicate that the way to 
engineer post-privatization ownership and governance structures and the way to modify 
incentives so as to make corporate actors look to the benefits of enhanced economic 
efficiency rather than to the rent they can extract from the state remain a great challenge 
during the transition in these postcommunist countries. 
1.2 Induced property rights reform in the SOE sector in East Asia 
Property rights reform in the East Asian transition economies contrasts markedly with 
the privatization approach widespread in Eastern Europe and Russia. Although it has 
been officially stated that the industrial reform in East Asia involves management 
reform but not reform in ownership, there is much evidence demonstrating that the 
clarification and reassignment of various property rights among different levels of 
governments, between government and enterprise, and among parties within the 
enterprises have progressed in a piecemeal, incremental and induced fashion. 
While reformers at the national level have established the broad parameters of enterprise 
reform, the actual outcomes have to a great extent been determined by the competition 
specific to localities and enterprises. Within an increasingly competitive environment, 
poor performance gives rise to pressure for reform, and reform improves performance. 
Low or declining profits lead directly to low or declining bonuses and welfare incomes, 
poor reputations, and so forth and thus motivate enterprise managers and employees to 
seek more autonomy and greater control over profits. Among local governments, 
particularly those at lower levels with fewer enterprises under their jurisdiction, the 
erosion of enterprise profits, the major source of local revenues, results in immediate 
fiscal distress. This distress not only destabilizes the distribution of fiscal revenues 
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among regions and administrative levels, but also reduces the bonuses and benefits, 
which in turn, hurt the reputations of local officials and thus supplies a strong incentive 
for local governments to push enterprise reform beyond even the limits set by the central 
government. An additional explicit contribution of competition - one which has not 
been well recognized - is the fact that competition has been gradually exhausting the 
monopoly profits of most state-owned industries, the traditional, primary source of fiscal 
revenues, and has thus been forcing both central and local governments to reform SOEs, 
support the development of township and village enterprises (TVEs) and encourage the 
establishment of other types of enterprises so as to generate more revenue and create 
more employment. 
In contrast to the unprecedented fall in output, employment and incomes following the 
transition in Eastern Europe and Russia, the SOE sector in the East Asian transition 
economies has done well relative to international standards, although it is still suffering 
financial troubles. In China, the real output of the SOE sector grew by 7.8 per cent per 
year from 1978 to 1995 despite greater competition from TVEs, joint-venture 
enterprises, foreign enterprises, and the international market (SSB 1995: 377; People's 
Daily 5 March 1996: 2). Moreover, the share of medium and large state-owned 
enterprises (over 500 employees) in total industrial output remained approximately 
constant (about 41 per cent), though the annual growth rate of overall industrial output 
was 14 per cent from 1978 to 1994 (Naughton 1995: 164-7 and 330-1; SSB 1995: 377).2 
There is increasing empirical evidence indicating that, despite the continuation of 
subsidies, state-owned enterprises with low profits have fallen behind in such areas as 
retained earnings, wages, bonuses, and access to funds (Rawski 1994), that the 
productivity of state-owned enterprises has risen with boosts in bonus payments and the 
number of contract workers (Groves et al. 1994), and that poor financial performance 
among enterprises located in jurisdictions experiencing financial distress generates 
pressure for reform and reform in turn improves performance (Jefferson, Zhao and Lu 
1995). 
In the case of Vietnam, SOEs in the industrial sector maintained their dominant role, 
and their GDP share climbed from 33 per cent in 1989 to 37 per cent in 1994 and 39 per 
cent in 1996 (Dodsworth et al. 1996; Mallon and Irvin 1997),3 although several 
thousand loss-making SOEs were liquidated, government subsidies were eliminated, 
implicit subsidies through the banking system were substantially reduced, and the 
principle of equal taxation among state and private firms was instituted. Given the 
2
 The GDP share of SOEs in China may be underestimated by a small margin, because official statistics 
count SOE joint ventures and shareholding companies as 'other ownership enterprises' even when most of 
the capital is invested by the SOEs. By the end of 1994, within the category of 'industrial enterprises with 
independent accounting systems', the assets of all kinds of jointly owned and shareholding enterprises 
accounted for 7.6 per cent of the total (SSB 1995: 53 and 384). 
3 In contrast to the classification in official Chinese statistics, SOEs and foreign joint-venture enterprises 
in Vietnam are counted as part of the state sector even when most of the capital is provided by the private 
partner. As a result the GDP share of SOEs is certainly overstated by a significant margin in the official 
statistics. On the other hand, the distinction between the state and private sectors has become increasingly 
blurred. For instance, some 700 nominal 'private' enterprises, which account for about 60 per cent of all 
private enterprises, are reported to belong to ministries or party organizations (Irvin 1996; Probert and 
Young 1995: 515). 
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average GDP growth rate of 7 per cent over this period, these macro-statistical data may 
be indicative of a remarkable surge in the performance and productivity of SOEs. With 
respect to micro-level evidence, a survey in January 1990 revealed that over 40 per cent 
of SOEs were suffering heavy losses, and only 20 per cent were thought to be operating 
at a profit (Kim 1994; Probert and Young 1995). By end of 1994, however, it is 
estimated that around 65 per cent of the 6,300 state-owned enterprises were operating at 
break-even or profitable levels (Doyle 1995), though among all state-owned enterprises 
the average profit ratios over fixed and working capital were still quite low, equal to 
about 7 and 11 per cent, respectively.4 
SOE reform in Laos involved the granting of managerial autonomy to state-owned 
enterprises during 1988-90 and the prevalence of fixed-term leasing after 1990. During 
the first period, fiscal subsidies and capital transfers to state-owned enterprises were 
successfully discontinued, but the overdue debts accumulated by SOEs to the banking 
system were substantial. Fixed-term leasing, although it did not change the structure; of 
ownership, seemed the most practical way to change the governance structure over the 
medium term and effectively hardened SOE budget constraints and provided much 
greater incentives to SOE management to improve performance (cf. Otani and Pham 
1996; World Bank 1994a). 
1.3 TVE miracle and TVE paradox 
The greatest achievement of the Chinese reform may be the emergence of the township 
and village enterprises. Between 1978 and 1995, the township and village enterprises 
realized a real average output growth of 21 per cent per annum. In 1993, the TVE sector 
exceeded the state sector in terms of industrial production and employment generation. 
It produced 44.5 per cent of total industrial output and provided employment to 123 
million people, whereas the state sector yielded 43 per cent of total industrial output and 
employed 102 million people (SSB 1995: 364-5 and 377).5 The emergence of rural 
entrepreneurs and enterprises has not been experienced in any other country on such a 
large scale and at such a rapid rate. Understanding the driving forces behind this 
spectacular growth is of great importance to international companies and investors 
seeking to do business with China. 
The township and village enterprises seem to possess features which are unparalleled in 
any organizations in the West or in other socialist economies. The residual benefit rights 
of TVEs are mainly enjoyed by local residents via their township or village 
governments. The residual control rights, including the right to appoint and remove 
managers, are typically possessed by community governments. TVEs do not face a soft-
budget constraint, but the financial liability for each individual TVE in the case of 
bankruptcy is not clearly defined. Very often, the township or village governments play 
a decisive role in mitigating the bankruptcy costs or facilitating reorganization. This role 
is similar to the main bank's role in a Japanese Keiretsu, but the underlying ownership-
4
 Cited by Thanh (1995) from Finance Ministry of Vietnam (1994) and State Planning Commission of 
Vietnam (1994). 
5
 In 1995, TVEs produced 55.8 per cent of China's total industrial output (SSB 1996: 389 and 403). 
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control structures are quite different. It seems that, as economic entities, the townships 
and villages, rather than individual TVEs, have unlimited liability, and this constraint in 
China is usually more burdensome for these entities than for a private enterprise, 
because the latter often employs strategic bankruptcy to avoid unlimited liability. 
The conceptualization of the nature and experience of TVEs have received much 
attention.6 While introducing specific insights to the analysis of the issue, each of the 
alternative perspectives seems to get bogged down in paradoxes. For example, 'local 
state corporatism' (Oi 1992 and 1995; Lin 1995), while supplying an instructive 
framework for understanding the mutual dependence between local governments and 
their enterprises, particularly TVEs, is unable to explain why county-run state 
enterprises, which are directly controlled by the 'headquarters' of a local state 
'corporation', i.e., the county government (Oi 1995: 30-3), have been the most 
inefficient. Emphasis on the TVE's ownership structure as 'a product of an environment 
in which an authoritarian government with monopolistic political power plays a 
dominant role in economic life' (Chang and Wang 1994: 450) seems to contradict the 
contribution of decentralization and to overlook the importance of internal factors. The 
'collective action' explanation (Pei 1996) and the 'cooperative culture' perspective 
(Weitzman and Xu 1994) are insightful in terms of an understanding of the internal 
factors within a village community, but they do not address the puzzle of why such 
action and culture did not avoid the problem of free-riders earlier, especially during the 
period of the communes. Together, these indicate that there is an urgent need to build up 
a consistent and comprehensive theoretical framework which captures the links between 
the unique ownership and governance structures of the TVEs and their goals, strategies 
and managerial behaviour in an increasingly competitive and internationally oriented 
environment. 
1.4 Ambiguous property rights in the private sector 
The overwhelming majority of privately owned enterprises in China and Vietnam are 
small individual or family type enterprises. However, instead of directly participating in 
markets on their own, most of these operate in tandem with community authorities, such 
as village governments, which contract with larger corporate organizations to produce 
certain items. 
Enterprises which expand beyond the family also tend to need support from community 
authorities. This support comes weighted with reciprocal sharing in both residual benefit 
rights and residual control rights. As a result, such firms are far from representative of 
private-ownership as this is commonly understood. Instead, they exhibit an ambiguous 
property rights arrangement which involves sharing between private entrepreneurs and 
community authorities (Li 1996). Although such an arrangement relies on the existence 
of a particular community spirit and a set of ambiguous and personalized relationships 
that may undermine the long-term development of these enterprises, it has certainly been 
mutually beneficial during the transition. It permits smooth business transactions among 
6
 Cf. Chang and Wang 1994; Lin 1995; Nee 1992; Oi 1992 and 1995; Pei 1996; Weitzman and Xu 1994. 
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relatively independent operators and supplies the sense of security needed for long-tenn 
development. At the same time, it creates additional sources of revenue for communities 
and administrative units and greatly facilitates the necessary administrative supervision 
and tax collection. 
1.5 Adaptive recombination versus immediate replacement 
The brief comparison offered earlier between privatization in Eastern Europe and 
property rights reform in East Asia suggests that, instead of thinking about institutional 
and organizational innovation as immediate replacements for the old ownership regimes, 
a more instructive perspective is to see it as a dynamic transformation process involving 
the disassembly and reassembly of existing institutional configurations. Using the 
concept of Schumpeter, organizational innovation should be thought of as the adaptive 
'recombination' rendered necessary because of the urgency of finding solutions to 
immediate practical dilemmas (Schumpeter 1934; Nelson and Winter 1982; Kogut and 
Zander 1992; Stark 1994 and 1996). Thus, our emphasis should lay on transformational 
processes rather than on fixed outcomes. Our attention should focus on the emergence 
of new elements in combination with competitive and cooperative adaptations and 
rearrangements of existing organizational structures. The old institutional forms may be 
inefficient. However, through innovative recombination and the addition of some new 
elements, they can become productive assets, resources, and the basis for credible 
commitments and coordinated actions (Williamson 1991 and 1995). 
Reflecting upon the transition experience, our thinking about property rights needs to 
depart from the Marxist practice of assuming that an 'owner' is an individual or a 
homogeneous monolithic group (e.g. capitalist-minded shareholders). The evolutionary 
experience of the developed market economies suggests that property rights are a bundle 
of rights which are neither indivisible nor unrestricted and that 'property can be 
productively disintegrated in ways such that different actors can legitimately clam 
rights to different aspects and capacities of the same thing' (Stark 1996: 126; see also 
Grey 1980; Hart 1988; Barzel 1989). Based on such a perspective, it becomes easier to 
understand why the transformation of property rights is typically a process of 
re-negotiation among a wide array of actors who are seeking to resolve their claims over 
a certain set of property rights. 
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II INNOVATIVE TRANSFORMATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM: 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
2.1 Market transition as a process of innovative adaptation 
In his book What Should Economists Do?, James Buchanan (1979: 29) emphasizes that 
'a market is not competitive by assumption or by construction', but 'becomes 
competitive, and competitive rules come to be established as institutions emerge' to 
shape behaviour. Such a 'process of becoming' is bound to go far beyond any kind of 
rationalist design or central planning, because the process evolves from sequences of 
economizing behaviour, market-learning institutional evolution, technical innovation, 
and, particularly, a multitude of cumulative and mutually reinforcing choices by 
numerous actors who have diverse interests and constantly evaluate alternatives and 
reconsider their previous views. 
The market economy in the West did not originate by blueprint. Its development is 
characterized by decentralized evolution, rather than conscious design. The concrete 
institutions operating in the West are rooted in capitalist structures and grow up through 
adaptive evolution. Therefore, they cannot be directly replicated in the East. The key 
lesson from the failure of centrally planned economies - that one cannot organize all 
economic processes into a grand design - may indicate that the attempt to replicate 
market institutions by following a rationalist design is doomed to failure as well. 
The market transition in both Eastern Europe and East Asia is bound to be path 
dependent. As Stark (1996) points out, the notion that the transition is a passage 
between two equilibrium social orders overstates the coherence of social settings both 
before and after the hypothesized transition and conversely exaggerates the degree of 
social disorganization during the presumed passage period. In Eastern Europe and 
Russia, the collapse of the formal structures of the communist regime did not result in 
an institutional vacuum. Most of the previously existing organizational forms and social 
ties have persisted. On the other hand, for a decade before 1989, market-like 
transactions and reciprocal relations were already widespread inside the socialist sector, 
as well as in the 'second economy'. For example, supply constraints led to bargaining 
between supervisors and informal teams on shop-floors. At the level of management, the 
task of meeting planning targets required a dense network of informal ties linking 
enterprises and other organizations. The allocative distortions of bureaucratic planning 
produced the conditions for the predominantly part-time entrepreneurship of the second 
economies (cf. Kornai 1980; Laky 1979; Sabel and Stark 1982). In the transition 
process, these parallel informal structures and interfirm and interorganizational 
networks have played an increasingly important role in the struggle of enterprises for 
survival. The interaction of market-oriented structures and the earlier types of 
organization has favoured and will continue to favour the emergence of hybrid forms of 
organization. 
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According to Hayek (1945: 523-4), 'economic problems arise always and only in 
consequence of change', and 'the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid 
adaptation in the particular circumstances of time and place'. 
Two kinds of adaptation are distinguished in transaction cost economics: autonomous 
adaptation and cooperative adaptation (Williamson 1991). Autonomous adaptation 
represents the adaptive capacity of an organization in the market. It corresponds to the 
market mechanism by which producers and consumers respond autonomously to market 
signals in general and price changes in particular so as to maximize profits (producers) 
and utility (consumers). Cooperative or coordinated adaptation refers to the authority 
relationship (fiat) of a hierarchy. In comparison with the market mechanism, 'the use of 
formal organization to orchestrate coordinated adaptation to unanticipated disturbances 
enjoys adaptive advantages as the condition of bilateral dependence progressively builds 
up', but at the cost of degrading incentive intensity and adding bureaucratic inefficiency 
(Williamson 1991: 279). Autonomous adaptation and coordinated adaptation, together 
with differential incentive intensity and differential reliance on administrative control, 
reflect the difference between the market and hierarchy. Between the polar modes of -Jie 
market and hierarchy, hybrid governance structures possess their own institutional 
advantages. In other words, a mode of weaker incentive intensity supported by added 
administrative control or, conversely, a mode of weaker administrative control 
supported by added incentive intensity can be optimal. 
The hybrid mode of governance structures may have greater significance in transition 
economies than in advanced capitalist economies, because hybrid forms 'use resources 
and/or governance structures from more than one existing organization' (Borys and 
Jemison 1989: 235) and thus are capable of reducing uncertainty in interorganizational 
relationships involving bilateral or multilateral dependence and of supplying an elastic 
contract mechanism to facilitate continuity and efficient adaptation. In comparison with 
hybrids in advanced capitalist economies, hybrids in transition economies lack a well-
specified structure of property rights. Therefore, they also lack sufficient autonomy and 
are faced with rapid changes and institutional uncertainty. For this reason, transitional 
hybrids of superior adaptive capacity are bound to be more flexible, informal and open 
to entrepreneurship. They must rely more on such social capital as personal ties and 
localism rather than on legal contracts to provide assurances that the terms of a 
transaction will be met by both parties (Nee 1992; Carrol, Goodstein and Gyeses 1988). 
2.2 Ownership as a bundle of rights 
A property right is the liberty or permit to enjoy benefits of wealth while 
assuming the costs which those benefits entail. ... property rights are not 
physical things or events, but are abstract social relations. A property 
right is not a thing (Fisher 1923: 27). 
Property rights are sanctioned relationships among people or organizations that arise 
from the existence of scarce goods, pertain to their use and are sanctioned by norms, 
customs and laws. An owner of property rights holds the consent of others to act in 
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particular ways without interference by the community, provided that these actions are 
not prohibited in the specifications of the rights. This definition of property rights is 
consistent with Roman law, common law, Karl Marx's writings, and the new 
institutional economics (Demsetz 1967; Pejovich 1990). Within the general concept of 
property rights, the ownership right is the most well known category consisting of a 
bundle of rights. The core bundle of these rights includes the following three elements. 
2.2.1 The right to utilize an asset 
This component of ownership rights is often distinguished as the 'utilization right' or the 
'control right'. It is also a collection of numerous specific rights, including management, 
decision-making and the supervision of utilization. There is a widespread division 
between ownership and control in modern corporations in capitalist economies and in 
SOEs in socialist or transition economies. In other words, the daily control of the asset is 
delegated by the owners to their agents or professional managers. For this reason, a 
residual control right, usually involving the right to appoint and remove managers and 
other rights beyond the content of contracts, is assumed to be the crucial dimension of 
ownership. Nonetheless, the separation of ownership from control is definitely a 
delegation of selected property rights to management. It requires the owner to create a 
variety of incentive schemes to assure that the management team satisfactorily performs 
the control functions. 
2.2.2 The right to capture benefits 
The right to capture benefits from the utilization specified under point 2.2.1 and the 
responsibility for negative outcomes such as debts and damages. This component of 
ownership rights is typically identified as the 'return right', involving the right to 
establish rules concerning the distribution of earnings. As an alternative to the notion 
that residual control rights should be treated as the crucial dimension of ownership, the 
right to collect residual returns is proposed as the key feature of ownership by Milgrom 
and Roberts (1990) and others (e.g. Zou 1992). Because of the fact that state socialist 
economies are commonly recognized as 'redistributive', distribution rights may be more 
relevant to property rights reform in the transition economies. 
In order to clarify further the significance of the right to residual returns in the process of 
property rights reform in East Asia, let us consider the position of the insider entity of an 
SOE under the 'contract responsibility system' accepted by the entity (quanyuan 
chengbao). Taking the simplest case, the entity pays a fixed amount of taxes and profits 
to the local or central government in exchange for the use of government-owned assets. 
In this case, the residual return is made up of the income from the utilization of the 
assets, less all costs, including the fixed amount of taxes and profits. Thus, all the 
employees of the SOE, rather than the principal government, possess the right to the 
residual returns. 
Full rights of disposal over residual returns provide the strongest automatic, spontaneous 
incentive to individual owners. If an owner makes successful use of his property, there 
will be a positive residual return that he can use autonomously. If he fails, he has to bear 
all the costs resulting from her mistake. That is to say, the rights of disposal over the 
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residual returns are full if and only if the utilization of the property affects the owner's 
own pocket. All other individuals who collaborate in the utilization of the property 
without enjoying the full rights of disposal over the residual returns must be given some 
artificially specified incentives to assure their successful utilization of the property 
(Kornai 1992). 
2.2.3 The right to change the form of assets 
The right to change the form or substance of the asset and the right to transfer all or 
some of the rights specified above to others at a mutually agreed price or as a gift. This 
aspect of ownership is usually referred to as the 'alienation right'. It involves the decision 
to buy or sell the asset and defines the owner's right to effect changes in the value of the 
specified asset. 
The alienation right includes an automatic, spontaneous incentive as well. The simplest 
example is offered by the situation in which the owner obtains the property by purchase 
and then disposes of it again by sale. Therefore, he has a direct interest in assuring a 
maximum increase in the net value of the property between the two transactions (Kornai 
1992). The owner also has an interest in being aware of the net benefits arising from 
alternative choices, such as the sale of the property, the rental of the property, or the use 
of the property as a gift for 'reciprocation1. 
Theoretically, it is evident that an infinite number of configurations of property rights is 
possible. The historical configurations of property rights are, nonetheless, created by 
social actors, shaped by struggles among various interests, and subject to changes over 
time and within different institutional environments. In recent years, the problems 
encountered in the enforcement of property rights are central in the literature of 
contracts, industrial organization and bureaucracies in the West, because the 
'attenuation' of property rights has become increasingly significant. An attenuation of 
property rights is usually induced by the restrictions imposed by government regulations 
on asset use, on the income flows from the asset and on the freedom of an owner to 
transfer some portion of property rights to others (Campbell and Lindberg 1990; Walder 
1994). 
In contrast to the trend whereby many of the restrictions established by the state through 
legal provisions are attenuating property rights in the Western market economies, the 
process of economic reform in the transition economies of East Asia is characterized by 
the downward devolution of property rights in political and administrative hierarchies or 
the reassignment and clarification of property rights among institutions, communities 
and households. Economic reform in East Asia has been dominated by the devolution of 
selected property rights over assets - particularly a large share of utilization rights and 
residual claim rights - from higher to lower levels of government administration or from 
government authorities to enterprises, households and individuals. These specific 
reassignments have significantly altered the incentives for economic behaviour, the 
distributional pattern of subsequent income flows, the structure of political power and 
interests, and thus the ownership and governance structures of state-owned enterprises 
(cf. among others, Lin, Cai and Li 1995; Naughton 1995; Walder 1994 and 1995). 
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2.3 The perceived values of the soft-budget constraint differ among SOEs7 
The metaphor of the soft-budget constraint reflects a collective expectation that there is 
an implicit subsidy plan of the state. In this subsidy plan, the state would cover or share 
pait of the losses of the state-owned enterprises which are suffering from financial 
troubles. The amount of the subsidy would be directly related to the amount of the losses 
of the firm. Thus, ex ante, there is an expected value for the soft-budget constraint for 
each SOE. It has not been well-recognized that this value is perceived differently by 
different state-owned enterprises. The more likely a firm is to be in financial trouble and 
the more serious this trouble is, the higher is the value of the soft-budget constraint for 
the firm. 
In order to understand more clearly the notion that the perceived values of the soft-
budget constraint differ among SOEs in transition economies, one can distinguish three 
separate financial situations which can be identified as the 'virtually bankrupt' situation, 
the 'loss-making but solvent' situation, and the 'profitable' situation. 
If a state-owned enterprise is in a profitable situation, the state bank has the right to 
directly withhold taxes, interest payments as well as part of the principal from the firm's 
bank account. Thus, if the probability is high that a firm will be profitable, the soft-
budget constraint has little value for the firm. As a consequence, the firm would be more 
responsive to market signals, such as changes in interest rates, prices and consumer 
preferences, for the purpose of maximizing its expected profit, over which state-owned 
enterprises have been enjoying increasing control. 
If an SOE is loss-making but solvent, it has made losses, but, owing to some self-
financing at the investment stage, it is still able to pay back loans and interest. In this 
case, the position of the firm is usually stronger in terms of the bargaining process with 
the state bank in order to delay interest and principal payments than it would have been 
had the firm been in the profitable situation. The bank usually has the right to refuse 
additional lending to such a firm, but may have to concede part of the existing loans or 
interest payments so as to guarantee the survival of the firm. The firm is similarly in a 
stronger position to request tax exemptions from tax authorities for the interest 
payments. Thus, if an SOE expects to be in a loss-making but solvent situation, the 
value it anticipates for the soft-budget constraint will be higher and its sensibility to 
market signals will be less relative to a state-owned enterprise in the profitable situation. 
If a state-owned enterprise is in the virtually bankrupt situation, it has lost so much that 
it is unable to pay off its loans and interest, and its survival depends on additional 
injections of loans from the state bank or on subsidies from the government. Thanks to 
the effective political and social constraints on bankruptcy in the SOE sector, the 
virtually bankrupt SOE is in the strongest position in terms of bargaining with the bank 
for more loans and with the government for more subsidies, even if it only seeks to pay 
wages and salaries. The value of the soft-budget constraint is best reflected in this 
situation, in which an otherwise bankrupt state-owned enterprise can do more than 
This subsection is mainly based on Subsection 2.3 in Zou and Sun (1996). 
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merely survive; it can also use its losses as a bargaining chip in order to assure new 
credits. If an SOE expects to be in such a situation, market signals will have the least 
impact on the firm's anticipated payoff, and its attention will be focused on bargaining 
with the state bank and the government so as to secure the flat wage and salaries of 
employees and to obtain new funds to finance future recovery. 
The recognition of the fact that state-owned enterprises in different financial situations 
perceive differently the value of the soft-budget constraint is important for our 
understanding of the way the SOE sector can evolve out of the planned economy in an 
environment in which the soft-budget constraint is still widespread and the market track 
exists alongside the planned track. The dual-track system may be the most significant 
characteristic of the Asian approaches to reform. For a long time now, experts have been 
attacking dual pricing and other dual-track systems for encouraging arbitrage, corruption 
and rent-seeking, providing misleading signals to SOEs although they still enjoy the 
soft-budget constraint, and thus representing inefficiency. While some of these problems 
have surfaced during the dual-track period, it is undeniable that the majority of state-
owned enterprises are indeed rationally responsive to the signals supplied by the market 
track, that they enjoy the rising payoff generated by market activities, and that (hey are 
evolving away from the planned track (Naughton 1995). 
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Ill PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM IN THE SOE SECTOR: 
PROCESSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
Because the existence of local government property rights over SOEs and the substantial 
downward devolution of financial power over residual revenues have played a leading 
role in the initiation and development of the programmes of property rights reform, it 
would help to introduce the features and functions of local government property rights 
and then to examine the process of the devolution of financial power over residual 
revenues from higher to lower levels of governments and the process of the 
reassignment of selected property rights between state-owned enterprises and their 
supervisory government bodies. An analysis of the performance consequences of these 
property rights reforms follows. 
3.1 Understanding local government property rights over SOEs in East Asia 
As argued in Granick (1990: 39-44), the property rights of regional governments over 
SOEs in China have existed at least since the early 1970s and probably since the 
Cultural Revolution, when a spontaneous decentralization of central authority took place 
against a background of chaos. The slogan 'whoever builds and manages the enterprise 
has the use of its output', which originated at least as early as 1966, is said to epitomize 
the property rights relationships of the 1970s. Remarkably, the slogan reflects a practice 
which is opposed to the usual treatment of the right to management as an attribute of 
ownership in that it indicates that ownership is an attribute of management. In the early 
1970s, several thousand medium and large state-owned enterprises were transferred 
back to the control of local governance (Wong 1985). Moreover, during the 1970s local 
governments, particularly provincial governments, expressed growing enthusiasm for 
the creation of new state-owned enterprises under their control and the retention for 
local use of the output of these SOEs. As a result, the share of local fixed investment in 
total investment in the SOE sector rose from 14 per cent in 1969 to over 40 per cent in 
the second half of the 1970s.8 A large number of small and medium state-owned 
enterprises were added in those years. The impossibility of incorporating these state-
owned enterprises into the central planning structure led to the creation of a multi-tiered, 
region-based system whereby much of the responsibility for planning and coordination 
devolved to local governments. In this system, state-owned enterprises were categorized 
by their importance. Thus, key large-scale SOEs remained under the control of central 
planning, while planning and coordination for non-essential state-owned enterprises 
were left to the provincial, municipal, prefectural and county levels. 
° In 1974, the '4-3-3 system' was officially accepted. This meant that 40 per cent of investment was to be 
financed and arranged directly by the central ministries and commissions and 30 per cent by local 
government bodies, while the remaining 30 per cent was to be co-arranged through negotiation between 
the central government and local governments (Zhou 1984: 143). 
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Before China's reform, the financial interests of local governments were weak, because 
monetary income during those years was of lesser importance. The ownership rights of 
local governments over their SOEs were exercised through the control over the 
distribution of marginal output at the regional level, the management of SOE operations, 
the material allocation within the constraint of delivery quotas for the central 
government, and the use of depreciation funds. 
The fiscal reform in the 1980s fundamentally altered the situation through the 
devolution of financial property rights from higher to lower levels of government and 
from supervisory government bodies to enterprises. First, instead of governments 
appropriating all profits from their own state-owned enterprises automatically, the SOEs 
were to be taxed according to fixed rates. The residual income left to the SOEs served to 
supply automatic and spontaneous incentives to managers and workers. Second, from 
the tax revenue collected from their own enterprises, each level of government turned 
over a contractually specified amount to the next higher level of government, while 
retaining the residual. 
Although the concrete arrangements have varied among regions and over different 
periods, the basic philosophy has been consistent: 'manage your revenue and 
expenditure by yourself (fenzao chifan). This system has given local governments the 
incentive to exercise financial property rights more effectively over the assets they 
administer. The better the financial performance of the local enterprises and the more 
rapid the economic growth of the region, the greater the annual increase in the revenues 
available to government control (cf. Wong 1992; World Bank 1994b; Walder 1995). 
Such direct causality has pushed local governments to initiate experimental reform 
programmes far ahead of the central government (Zhang and Yi 1995). 
The greater control over residual revenues has been accompanied by more expenditure 
responsibility. Local governments must strain to meet the expenditure obligations 
imposed by the policies of higher level governments. They must take direct 
responsibility for the solution of a large range of social problems arising from 
unemployment, housing shortages, infrastructure deficiencies, growing dissatisfaclion in 
the consumption sector, and so on. They must also promote more rapid local economic 
growth so as to enhance their own negotiating position within the hierarchy. 
Faced with these strong pressures, each level of local government has suffered 'revenue 
hunger' - although the disposable budgetary revenues available following the sharing 
process have significantly shifted in favour of the lower levels of government,9 - and 
has been paying more attention to the generation of 'extrabudgetary revenue', which is 
not shared with higher levels of government. The value of extrabudgetary funds jumped 
y
 The best proxy for the disposable budgetary revenues available following the sharing process is real 
budgetary expenditure. On the basis of this proxy, the central government share of total disposable 
budgetary revenues fell from 54 per cent in 1980 to 40 per cent in 1991-92. At the provincial level, a 
similar 'decentralization trend' has been evident. For instance, in Shandong Province, the provincial share 
in the total for the province fell from 34 per cent in 1980 to 17 per cent in 1993. The share of cities and 
prefectures rose from 16 per cent to 26 per cent during the same period, while the combined share of 
counties and townships rose from 50 per cent to 57 per cent (Wong 1995). 
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from only 20 per cent of the size of the national budget in 1980 to equality with the 
national budget in 1991-92.10 Before the fiscal reform, they were primarily composed of 
depreciation funds, which were managed by local economic authorities in the form of 
grants for the renovation of the capital equipment of local enterprises. The reform 
created new sources of extrabudgetary revenue, principally a new set of local taxes and a 
series of new levies on local enterprises (Wong 1992 and 1995). The extrabudgetary 
funds have been predominantly used as investment funds and have served to promote 
local industry and infrastructure (SSB 1995: 223). It is clear that the financial 
performance of local enterprises has a large and direct incremental impact on both the 
budgetary and the extrabudgetary revenues of local governments. The lower the level of 
government, the smaller the revenue base and the keener the competition faced by local 
enterprises and, therefore, the stronger the impact of the financial performance of local 
enterprises on local revenue. 
Because they have the smallest revenue base and are confronted with the greatest 
pressure from rising living standard and growing competition, township and village 
governments have shown the strongest motivation to develop TVEs and private 
enterprises (Oi 1995). In turn, as the relevant political restrictions set by the central 
government have become more flexible, county and prefectural governments have been 
the most interested in the restructuring of their own most inefficient small-scale state-
owned enterprises through a great diversity of bold methods, including the establishment 
of joint ventures with foreign investors, the introduction of employee stock ownership 
plans, the sale or lease of SOE assets to management and employees, the sale of SOEs to 
outside investors, liquidation, and equitization (Chinese Youth 1996: 14-20; Gu 1996; 
Parker and Pan 1996).u Municipal and provincial governments exhibit a preference for 
relatively moderate property rights reform. The central government usually lags behind 
in term of the promotion of property rights reform (Zhang and Yi 1995). 
In the case of Vietnam, provincial and local governments historically enjoyed 
considerable economic autonomy from the central government. In pre-colonial days, the 
village was the basic unit of government. Even afterwards, in pre-communist days, 
villages sought to adapt national decrees to their particular needs, that is, 'the laws of the 
emperor are less than the customs of the village' (Probert and Young 1995). Under the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, from 1954 to 1975, the efforts to strengthen central 
control were in fact reversed because of the war in the south. Under the wartime 
conditions, especially after 1965 when American bombing of the north began, most of 
the state-owned enterprises already established in urban areas were forced to move into 
the mountainous regions. Local self-sufficiency in supply was clearly a critical factor for 
survival. This primacy of self-sufficiency led in turn to the establishment of more locally 
run SOEs. 
10 Since 1993 the extrabudgetary revenues and expenditures of state-owned enterprises and their 
responsible authorities have been excluded in official statistics (SSB 1995: 222). This implies that these 
funds are being treated as a part of the funds raised by SOEs and their responsible authorities. These are 
called 'off-budgetary funds' in the literature (for instance, see Wong 1995). 
11 The bold initiation of SOE reform by county and prefectural governments since the early 1990s is 
described in the next subsection. 
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The record of economic changes in Vietnam since unification has shown a cyclical 
pattern. The cycle begins with the efforts of the central government to impose central 
planning. An economic crisis follows. Meanwhile, local governments and their SOEs 
start to resist the central planning by 'fence breaking' and expanding market-oriem:ed 
activities. These activities are tolerated by the central government to a certain extent, 
and, as a result, the crisis is overcome. Ironically, the economic recovery may lead to 
new support for the central planning model, as occurred in 1982-83. The readoption of 
this model induces a new economic crisis and, as a consequence, a new round of reform 
(Fforde and Vylder 1996; Probert and Young 1995). 
In the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 'the local level is a constant objective structure 
of the Lao society' (Kaysone Phomvihane, the secretary-general of the Lao Communist 
Party, cited in Evans 1988: 31-2). Laos does not possess a unified national economy. 
Rather, it has a combination of a central economy and local economies. In most cases, 
the governments at each level are organized like sovereign governments, since there is 
no telecommunications between the capital and most provincial centres and more than 
half the road network is impassable in the rainy season. Provincial and district 
governments have approximately 12 departments which mirror the central government 
ministries. However, there are no functional or hierarchical ties between the central and 
local administrations in the same areas. The local administration is under the sole 
authority of the president of the local administrative committee. The modern sector, 
which plays only a marginal role in the economy, is likewise extremely fragmented. 
Each sectoral administration at each level of government supervises those state-owned 
enterprises located on its territory and in its sector. As a consequence, the Lao 
experience indicates that there is no scope for building socialism in a subsistence 
economy, and this has finally been admitted by the party. With respect to the history of 
Soviet Marxism-Leninism, the evolution of the economic doctrine of Lao communists 
appears to backtrack from war communism to the cooperative movement to the New 
Economic Policy and finally to primitive capitalism (cf. Bourdet 1995; Evans 1988; 
Funck 1993). 
3.2 The reassignment of property rights in the SOE sector 
3.2.1 China's first two sets of property rights reforms 
Prior to the reform, the ownership rights of different levels of government over their 
state-owned enterprises were far more extensive than those exercised by the owner of a 
firm in a market economy. Through their line departments, the governments exerted 
direct control over all factors of production within the SOE sector. Customers, suppliers, 
managers, technicians, and workers all had only very limited freedom to exercise 
autonomous choice, because of the absence of product and factor markets and legal 
guarantees. The absence of choice in fact precluded the right of production factors to 
enter into voluntary contracts which specified rewards and obligations. If one views this 
causality from the opposite perspective, it can be seen that this absolute ownership 
implies that the creation of product and factor markets and the choice enjoyed by market 
participants would undermine government control and coercion. Markets disperse 
effective ownership and favour voluntary contracts to specify rewards and obligations. 
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This means that in the transition economies competitive markets have an additional 
function: to induce and promote property rights reform (Jefferson, Zhao and Lu 1995). 
Three sets of SOE property rights reforms have been successively implemented along 
with 'stop-go' cycles in China. The first two have been characterized by the reassignment 
of selected control rights and claim rights to residual returns, whereas the third one has 
involved the reassignment of alienation rights as well. 
The first reform effort, undertaken between 1979 and 1983, consisted of tentative steps 
towards an expansion of the role of financial incentives through profit retention and 
towards improved performance through greater enterprise autonomy. Following the 
initial success of experiments with the expansion of SOE autonomy at six state-owned 
enterprises in Sichuan Province in 1978, central government leaders in April 1979 
decided to expand the autonomy of another eight in Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. 
On 13 July 1979, five documents on the experimental reform were officially issued 
(System Reform Commission of China 1984). The documents specified that the state-
owned enterprises selected for the experiments would have the right to retain a share of 
profits, enjoy a relatively higher depreciation rate, and have the right to sell any above-
plan output. Although the programme as initially proposed was only for a small number 
of experimental SOEs, officials at various levels of government quickly saw the benefits 
of profit retention by their subordinate enterprises. As a result, the programme became 
overextended nationwide (Lin, Cai and Li 1994: 128-9; Naughton 1995: 99-100; Shirk 
1993: 200-04). 
In fact, the reform was very limited. The reassignment of control rights to managers 
involved only their participation in non-plan activities and restricted autonomy in the 
allocation of bonuses. Decisions about investment, technical renovation, changes in 
production lines, financing, and the rules for the use of the limited profits retained were 
still closely supervised by government officials. Within a context in which some needed 
financial rationalization had not been carried out, simple rules of thumb were 
established to determine the share of enterprise profits that could be retained. Typically, 
this meant that marginal retention was equal to or less than average retention.12 Because 
the marginal retention rate was very low, about 12.6 per cent on average in 1980, this 
scheme was bound to have quite weak incentive effects. Moreover, marginal retention 
rates varied enormously among state-owned enterprises because of an adverse selection 
principle ('whipping the faster ox'): the higher the profits per worker, the lower the 
marginal retention rates. The most profitable firms therefore had the weakest incentives. 
The second round of SOE property rights reforms was implemented between 1984 and 
1988 and remained in force between 1989 and 1992. It centred on two innovations: a 
dual-track pricing system and the enterprise contract responsibility system. The dual-
track pricing system effectively partitioned SOE inputs and outputs into planned and 
marketed components. Actively responding to this system, most state-owned enterprises 
steadily boosted their marginal sales and purchases on the markets so as to catch the 
In other words, if profit increases by 1 per cent, profit retention will increase by 1 per cent or less. 
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benefits arising from market transactions. Under the contract responsibility system, SOE 
managers and employees agreed to fulfil specific obligations. These typically involved 
targets for profits and productivity, as well as other profit-sharing rules. The targets were 
negotiated individually for each enterprise. In return, the state-owned enterprises 
obtained greater control over business operations, such as the drafting of output plans 
and prices, the choice of customers and suppliers, the fixing of wage and bonus 
differentials, and decisions on the use and allocation of retained profits and depreciation 
funds (Jefferson, Zhao and Lu 1995). 
During the first phase of reform, expanded enterprise autonomy was seen as a method to 
provide planners with indirect levers to steer SOEs. Under the contract responsibility 
system, autonomy was increasingly seen as a way to enhance entrepreneurial responses 
to market-determined supply and demand signals. During this second round of reform, 
the marginal retention rates were significantly higher than the average retention rates, 
and the short-run compensations available to managers were raised. A World Bank 
survey of 950 state-owned enterprises nationwide found that the average profit-retention 
rate within the sample hovered at about 35 per cent, and the dictum 'the larger the profit, 
the larger the retention share' seemed to hold true for the majority of contracting 
arrangements for these SOEs (Jefferson, Zhao and Lu 1995). However, with only a few 
exceptions, profit targets were renegotiated annually because of the rapidly changing 
environment. As a consequence, managers had to be concerned with 'ratchet' effects, 
that is, an increase in the coming year's profit targets imposed on successful performers, 
Government entities continued to be involved in the determination of every aspect of a 
firm's compensation schedule. More negatively, in order to assure growth in wages and 
bonuses, SOE managers would boost profits in the short term by cutting depreciation 
allowances, underreporting operation costs, postponing necessary investment, and 
neglecting asset maintenance (Sun 1992). 
During the second phase of reform, although the majority of virtually bankrupt state-
owned enterprises (cf. Section 1.3) were not closed down by the courts under trie 
bankruptcy law,13 reorganization or 'consolidation' (jianbing) started to play an 
important role. The principal form of consolidation involved the takeover of the 
operations of loss-making enterprises by well-performing enterprises (both SOEs and 
TVEs). The major incentives for the takeovers included the opportunity for the 
consolidating enterprises to control the land occupied by the loss-making firms, to 
expand their labour and wage-bill quotas and to integrate the operations of the loss-
making firms into their own operations. From 1987 to mid-1989, about 3,424 
enterprises, most but not all of which were SOEs, were taken over by a total of 2,857 
other enterprises in 27 provinces (Naughton 1995: 240). This means that 1.8 per cent of 
all state-owned enterprises were taken over each year. In the first half of 1992, 600 
SOEs were taken over (People's Daily 6 August 1992: 1). For the entire year, this would 
work out to 1.2 per cent of all state-owned enterprises. This would not be a trivial rate of 
reorganization even in market economies such as Japan and the United States. Besides 
consolidation, loss-making SOEs also reacted to their financial difficulties by 
13
 A bankruptcy law came into effect in November 1988, but by the end of 1993 only 88 SOEs had been 
declared bankrupt (China Information Daily, 22 November 1993: 2). 
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furloughing workers and furnishing workers with subsistence support rather than regular 
wages. Thus, the losses of state-owned enterprises were passed along to workers and 
managers in the form of lower income. At little social cost, these practices represented a 
radical break from the old system, which offered complete protection for state-owned 
enterprises and SOE employees. 
3.2.2 China's recently initiated radical property rights reform 
The third round of property rights reform was initiated in 1992, following the decisive 
push for renewed reform by Deng Xiaoping during his 'imperial tour' of South China at 
the beginning of that year. Since then, the international media have paid a great deal of 
attention to the two new stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Because stock 
exchanges are potent symbols of a capitalist economy, the establishment of stock 
exchanges in a socialist country like China does indicate a fundamental change. In terms 
of property rights reform, however, the change is more ideological than practical. The 
stock exchanges are still considered a government experiment. Substantial limitations 
have been imposed on the development of the two exchanges. The number of companies 
listed on the stock market is tightly controlled, and there is no guarantee that all firms 
satisfying the strict requirements can be listed. By 1994, fewer than 300 companies were 
listed on the two exchanges, and the shares of only a handful of Chinese companies 
were listed on stock exchanges outside the country. In any case, an overwhelming 
majority of the stock in the listed companies continues to be held by the government and 
other state institutions.14 The few institutional investors in the stock markets are owned 
and administered by state banks. In short, virtually every individually listed company is 
securely controlled by the government or by trustworthy agents of the government. 
Thus, contrary to the expectations formulated in the Western media, the stock exchanges 
and the share system do not serve as vehicles for a significant divestment of SOEs. 
Several thousand nominal joint stock corporations with unlisted shares have appeared 
since the mid-1980s. However, most of these are not really joint-stock companies at all. 
They may have issued 'shares' to insiders only for the purpose of raising capital. These 
shares are not coupled with any rights of ownership, and they have been treated as bonds 
with fixed dividends. On average, the book value of the shares accounts for only about 
20 per cent of the total value of the firms {Yearbook of China's Economic System 
Reform 1992: 322). 
Although these exercises have certainly been necessary for the development of capital 
markets, they may not represent the most important trend in the third round of property 
rights reform. The most radical reform was once again initiated by local governments. 
Faced with the renewed impulse for reform, local governments obtained a more flexible 
commitment from the central authority to allow experimentation with local firms. 
Seeing an advantage, a number of cities and provinces took the bold, radical step of 
1 4
 For instance, 62 per cent of the share value of all the companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
at the end of 1992 was held by the government, 24 per cent by 'legal entities' (predominantly other state 
companies), only 7 per cent by individuals resident in China, and 7 per cent by foreign capital (Li 1993). 
Of the shares issued in 1993, 79 per cent were held by the government and other state corporations 
(Guanli Shijie 1994). 
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reassigning ownership rights over state-owned enterprises selectively or fully. The most 
impressive reform was implemented by cities, particularly county- and prefectural-level 
cities. 
TABLE 1 
RADICAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORMS RECENTLY INITIATED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Location Initiated reforms 
Zhucheng City, Shandong Province 
Danzhou City, Hainan Province 
Quanzhou City, Fujian Province 
Dalian City <a 
Shunde City, Guangdong Province 
Wuhan City <a 
Hangzhou City, capital of Zhejiang 
Province 
Shaoguan City, Guangdong 
Province 
Sichuan provincial government 
Heilongjiang provincial government 
Shanghai (b 
- Enterprise Exchange (c 
- Shanghai Lantern Factory 
Tianjin (b 
204 of the city's 274 SOEs were transferred to full employee stock 
ownership between 1992 and 1994. The city government received 
over 100 million yuan in cash through the sale. 
Chunjiang Sugar Refinery, a large loss-making but solvent SOE, 
was transferred to full employee stock ownership in 1995. 
In 1992, China Strategic Holdings Ltd, a Hong Kong company, 
reorganized 41 of the city's 42 industrial SOEs into joint equity 
ventures in which it holds a share of over 51 per cent. It has 
reorganized more than 200 SOEs in China in the same way. 
All 101 SOEs in the light industry sector were taken over by China 
Strategic Holdings in 1993 through joint equity ventures. 
164 SOEs, most of them small, were reorganized through a mixture 
of equity sales to foreigners, discounted stock offerings and 
management buyouts in 1994-95. 
25 bankrupted SOEs were auctioned off. The municipal 
government is encouraging the foreign purchase of 30 other 
bankrupt SOEs. 
Four SOEs producing rubber, beer, wine, and electronics 
equipment were taken over by China Strategic Holdings in 1993-94 
Three-day trade and investment fair. In 1994, 41 SOEs were 
offered for sale. 
In 1994 decided to sell 33 medium and large SOEs (each 
employing an average 2,300 workers) in industries such as 
machinery, electronics, metallurgy, and pharmaceuticals to 
overseas bidders. 
Built 18 property rights exchange markets. The ownership of 290 
enterprises was transferred through the markets (1994-95). 
329 businesses, mainly TVEs, were put up for sale. SOEs are 
expected to follow. 
Employee buyout in early 1994 
Bohai Beer Factory, a large bankrupt SOE, was taken over by a 
Hong Kong-Australian venture 
Sources: Chinese Reform (1996: 42-3); Chinese Youth (1996: 14-9); Gu (1996); Naughton (1995 
300-01); Parker and Pan (1996: 121). 
Notes: (a A line-item city enjoying provincial-level status in economic matters; 
(b Provincial-level city; 
(c Electronics market. 
County and prefectural state-owned enterprises have typically been the most inefficient 
ones. These are often too small to apply economies of scale, but too bureaucratic to be 
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able to exploit their small size as township and village enterprises usually can. Finding a 
way to compensate for the rising losses of local SOEs has been the number one 
headache for most county and prefectural governments. 
The reform measures adopted by local governments have included the sale of state-
owned enterprises to insiders and outside investors, the lease of SOE assets to 
management and employees, and permission to foreign companies and other non-state 
institutions to take over local SOEs (Table 1). All these measures are still being hotly 
debated among central government officials and the ideological authorities of the party. 
It can be anticipated that the final outcome of the debate will not be determined by 
ideology, but by the efficiency and welfare consequences of the reforms. Moreover, in 
contrast to the political environment during the initial stage of the implementation of the 
household responsibility system, which had to be secretly undertaken by peasants in 
Anhui Province in 1978, the majority of the reactions during this phase of the reforms 
have been quite positive. For instance, despite the absence of central government 
recognition and encouragement, more than 6,000 visiting groups, consisting of over 
80,000 local government leaders and SOE managers, have voluntarily visited Zhucheng 
City since 1993 to learn more about the so-called 'Zhucheng model' (Chinese Youth 
1996: 14). 
All the reforms listed in Table 1 have shown remarkable efficiency benefits and, at the 
same time, have not generated any substantial social costs such as notable 
unemployment or temporary cuts in production. This is mainly because the local 
governments have promoted local revenue creation, assured social stability and been 
able to play the leading role in the design and implementation of the reform process. The 
significant efficiency benefits and very limited social costs of these reforms mean that 
property rights reform will become widespread in the near future. 
The new round of reform can be understood more clearly through an example. In 
Zhucheng in early 1992, there were 274 state-owned enterprises. While the average SOE 
had 180 employees, some employed more than 1,000 workers. At the time, 68.7 per cent 
of the SOEs were experiencing losses. The cumulative losses almost equalled the total 
net book value of all the SOEs.15 The interest subsidies alone amounted to over 10 
million yuan per year. The city government had to struggle very hard to assure the 
timely payment of wages. 
To solve these problems, the city government proposed the implementation of a joint-
stock-ownership scheme involving the government and the employees in selected state-
owned enterprises. However, this proposal was voted down by the SOE employees, who 
exhibited a strong preference for full employee stock ownership (FESO).16 This 
approach was adopted. As the original owner of the SOEs, the city government insisted 
that the assets of the state-owned enterprises should not be undervalued. Within the 
FESO framework, the minimum share each worker was required to purchase was valued 
1 5
 The net book value does not seem to include the value of the land used by the SOEs. 
1° The land is still owned by the state. The FESO enterprises now rent utilization rights to the land from 
the state via the city government. 
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at 5,000 yuan, which represented about two average annual incomes for a worker in the 
city in 1992. Any worker deciding not to buy the minimum share would have been 
subject to the loss of his position. As a consequence, no worker refused to buy a share, 
and no extra unemployment was induced (Chinese Youth 1996: 14-9). 
Between 1992 and 1994, 204 of the city's 274 SOEs were transferred to FESO. The city 
government received over 100 million yuan in cash from the sale. This money was 
placed in a city investment fund. By 1995 the annual interest income from the fund was 
exceeding the total profits from the contracts of the 204 SOEs in 1992. Moreover, all the 
FESO enterprises were soon profitable once more so that the fiscal revenue of the city 
increased very rapidly. Before long, the city government was able to invest several 
dozen million yuan per year into city infrastructure and city social development, thereby 
altering the city's fiscal status from wage provider to investor. The major function of the 
city government was also transformed from heavy intervention in SOE operations to a 
focus on the establishment of a social security network covering all enterprises in the 
city and other social reform issues. Meanwhile, by 1994 the average annual income per 
worker, including wages, bonuses and dividends, had reached 5,000 yuan, double the 
1992 figure (Chinese Youth 1996: 14-9). 
Emerging employee shareholding schemes in Eastern Europe and Russia often do not 
involve mechanisms or arrangements so that effective control can be exercised. Even in 
employee stock ownership plans in the West, the employee shares are often held in 
trusts run by management (Earle and Estrin 1996). No such problems have appeared in 
the enterprises listed in Table 1. For instance, in Zhucheng most of the original 
managers and deputy managers of the loss-making firms failed to be elected to the 
boards of directors of the successor firms. After FESO went into effect, any elected: 
directors or managers who continued to be too 'bureaucratic' or who did not show 
sufficient initiative were reportedly soon being replaced by more competent candidates 
at general shareholder meetings. 
According to the theoretical literature, in an employee-owned firm, if decisions are 
reached on the basis of voting weighted in line with shareholdings rather than on the 
basis of one worker-one vote, and more importantly, if workers can freely buy and sell 
their ownership shares on a competitive market and can thereby diversify their capital 
risk, the output and employment decisions of the firm will be identical to those taken in 
firms owned by external investors. To promote the emergence of a competitive market 
for transactions in enterprise shares for a large number of firms, including FESO, a new 
round of reforms would be needed in the near future, although it would consume more 
time and more human capital. 
The central government has also revealed its willingness to support the transformation 
of most state-owned enterprises into stock corporations. According to the '50 Articles:' 
approved at the Third Plenum of the 14th Central Committee in November 1993, the 
shares in centrally-controlled SOEs are to be held by the state in the first instance, 
though the intention is to distribute the shares gradually to provincial and local 
governments, banks, asset management companies, and other SOEs. This suggests that 
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the central government favours cross-ownership among various government bodies and 
state institutions. Nonetheless, stock sales to the private sector are also to be permitted. 
While SOE assets are to remain the property of the state, full legal control over SOE 
operations will probably be delegated to management, and management is in turn to bear 
full responsibility for profits and losses. Those state-owned enterprises which are 
virtually bankrupt will probably be allowed to go bankrupt. The '50 Articles' also 
encourage SOEs to institute modern management organization and methods so as to 
improve the use of assets. 
Since 1994, a number of these reforms have been tested. Although there has been no 
real progress on a proposal to transform around 10,000 state-owned enterprises into 
corporations, a trial of some of the reforms - called 'optimizing the capital structure of 
the state sector' - in 50 medium and large cities appears to be proceeding well. During 
the first half of 1996, through capital restructuring, state assets in these cities rose by 6.6 
billion yuan, 215 SOEs were taken over or merged, 131 SOEs were declared bankrupt, 
and the jobs of more than 500,000 workers were reorganized (People's Daily 10 August 
1996: 1). 
China's property rights reform may continue to be promoted because of the urgency of 
the immediate practical problems. The reforms will likely remain characterized by the 
application of 'learning-by-doing' methods, experimentalism and pragmatism and will be 
dominated by local governments. As a consequence, if there is no serious political 
disruption, the probability is good that economic reforms will remain compatible with 
economic growth and social stability. 
The third set of property rights reforms has been initiated in only a relatively small 
number of cities which are located in coastal areas. The great majority of SOEs still 
suffer from the unresolved problems accompanying the second round of reform (see 
Section 3.2.1). Particularly due to the less favourable structural conditions and the 
greater fiscal dependence on the central government, the pace of reform in the vast 
interior regions has lagged far behind that along the coast (Raiser 1996). As a result, the 
value of the losses registered by state-owned enterprises had reached 61 billion yuan 
(about $7.4 billion) by the end of 1996. Among the 120 million SOE employees, the 
jobs of 20 million are thought to be unnecessary and 2.2 million receive token salaries 
from factories with closed production lines. The SOE sector is still characterized by 
over-heated capital construction, excessive production capacity, the insufficient use of 
facilities, redundant workers, outdated technologies, low energy efficiency, high 
production costs, and poor competitiveness. The reform of state-owned enterprises in 
the structurally weaker interior regions of the country will continue to be a major 
dilemma for economic policy makers (cf. People's Daily 2-10 March 1997). 
3.2.3 Vietnam's three rounds of property rights reforms 
Similar to the reform process in China, three sets of SOE property rights reforms can be 
identified in Vietnam. The first set of reforms was undertaken during 1979-82 and, in a 
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somewhat altered fashion, during 1982-85. It was characterized by spontaneous 'fence 
breaking' at the grassroots level. 
By the end of the 1970s material shortages, the threat of widespread famine and the near 
isolation of Vietnam from the outside world had essentially broken down the system of 
state allocations for subsidized inputs and of state procurement of consumer goods for 
rationing. SOEs had to establish horizontal contacts with each other and, more 
importantly, to participate in free market activities in order to solve the most acute 
shortages of food, inputs and spare parts. Consequently, state-owned enterprises began 
to swap or sell their products on the free market to earn cash so that they could fulfil 
their needs, likewise on the free market. 
These spontaneous steps to maintain and stimulate production received some political 
support during the VI Party Plenum in August 1979, but there was no shift in official 
policy until January 1981. At that time, a government decree (No. 25-CP) recognized 
the fence-breaking activities and announced the launch of a 'three-plan' system Stale-
owned enterprises under Plan A were to use the subsidized inputs supplied by the state 
to reach output quotas which were set by the state. The output was also to be procured 
by the state. In return, Plan A state-owned enterprises were permitted to keep 50 per cent 
of their profits. Plan B, which could only be initiated if additional inputs were required 
for the production of 'list' goods subject to the state monopoly, permitted SOEs to 
acquire materials from non-state sources. In this case, the share of the profits which 
could be retained by an SOE increased to 60 per cent. Under Plan C, state-owned 
enterprises were permitted to produce items not in the state plan, sell them freely at 
negotiated prices and keep 90 per cent of the profit. 
As long as an SOE had fulfilled its Plan A targets, it could engage in Plan B and Plan C 
activities. However, attracted by the significant benefits arising from arbitrage between 
the central plan requirements and the market segments, SOEs often routinely transferred 
state-supplied materials from Plan A to Plans B and C in order to capture the rents 
generated by the two-track pricing system. 
It is widely accepted that the three-plan system contributed to the recovery in state 
industrial output in the early 1980s. Annual industrial growth rate averaged about 9 per 
cent during those years. Nevertheless, the recovery was most clearly marked in areas, 
sensitive to market demand and in which domestic raw materials were readily available 
(cf. Fforde and Vylder 1996: 138-9; McCarty 1993; Probert and Young 1995). 
The second set of reforms, undertaken during 1986-89, focused initially cm 
macroeconomic issues such as further price liberalization, the elimination of local 
control mechanisms which inhibited internal trade, and the shift away from a 
development strategy oriented towards heavy industry. It was a bold response to the 
spiralling inflation and other compelling economic problems which had mainly been 
caused by the reassertion of the command-economy model and rural collectivization 
during 1982-85. SOE reform was renewed through two principal pieces of legislation: a 
decree (No. 217) issued in January 1988 and another document announced three months 
later. SOEs which were officially included in a 'new statute' could make a single 
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contribution to the state budget' that took the form of taxes rather than planned output 
quotas. These state-owned enterprises were also given greater autonomy and were 
encouraged to establish market-like linkages with other enterprises and among different 
sectors. In addition, a profit-based accounting system was introduced. However, most 
large SOEs were excluded from the reform. For them, the planning apparatus remained 
largely intact, although they still had the opportunity to engage in above-plan production 
(Fforde and Vylder 1996; Probert and Young 1995). 
Along with the substantial marketization, structural readjustment and increasing 
openness to the world market, the market share of SOEs was reduced by a large amount, 
even as government orders continued to fall significantly. The result was a twofold 
growth in inventories by 1990. At the end of 1989, fully 40 per cent of all SOEs were 
recording heavy losses and only about 20 per cent seemed to be operating at a profit 
(Thanh 1995; Probert and Young 1995). Moreover, the urgency of the SOE reform was 
sharpened by a new external shock, the withdrawal of Soviet aid, which in various 
forms had accounted for about 40 per cent of the government budget. 
Under such conditions, budgetary considerations alone could force the government to 
cut its fiscal subsidies to the state-owned enterprises and to seek to eliminate loss-
making SOEs. Thus, the third set of SOE reforms, initiated in 1989, consisted of cuts in 
budget subsidies for SOEs, the establishment of positive real interest rates, the shutdown 
of hopelessly loss-making SOEs, and the transfer of management and financial 
responsibilities for the SOEs to SOE managers, including full autonomy in the setting of 
prices, the formulation of production plans based on market demand, and investment 
decisions. 
This round of reforms led to substantial changes in the SOE sector. Over 2,800 state-
owned enterprises were liquidated, and another 3,000 were merged with viable SOEs, so 
that by early 1994, only about 6,500 to 7,000 SOEs remained registered with the State 
Planning Commission. The 800,000 layoffs which resulted were mainly absorbed by the 
rapidly developing non-state sector. The economic benefits of these reforms were also 
significant. Budget deficits were substantially reduced. The SOE sector showed a strong 
growth trend and maintained its GDP share despite the remarkable GDP growth rates. 
The profitability of SOEs was improved as well, although soft bank credit and 
protective entry barriers were introduced once again for some SOEs in essential 
industries, and there is still a considerable degree of management weakness in the SOEs 
(cf. Dollar 1994; Irvin 1995; Probert and Young 1995; Thanh 1995). 
In parallel with the liquidation and merger of loss-making SOEs, the government 
announced in 1992 and 1993 an 'equitization' programme to transform a number of 
medium-scale, non-strategic SOEs into stock companies. However, progress has been 
quite slow. By mid-1995 only four SOEs had been equitized. On average, 30 per cent of 
the shares of the equitized SOEs are held by local governments, 40 per cent by 
employees, and 30 per cent by outside investors. Freeman (1996) lists nine subjective 
hurdles and 13 objective hurdles among the difficulties of equitization in Vietnam. 
Among the hurdles perhaps the most important is the fact that the design of the 
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programme has attracted neither management, nor employees. In this case, the Zhucheng 
model in China might be instructive. 
Since the second wave of reform, SOEs in Vietnam have benefited greatly from foreign 
investment in the form of joint ventures. Between 1988 and 1994, foreign investment 
may have accounted for a combined total of approximately 10 percentage points (one-
fifth) of aggregate economic growth. In addition, foreign investment has played an 
important role in the transfer of technology and in offering Vietnamese more exposure 
to modern organizational and managerial techniques. The SOE sector has benefited 
more than has the private sector in these processes. Owing to their established links with 
policy makers, their preferential access to quotas, land and bank credits, and their 
relatively larger size, SOEs have been a more attractive domestic partner in joint 
ventures (Dodsworth et al. 1996; Mallon and Irvin 1997). Because official statistics 
record the output of these joint ventures as SOE output, the SOE joint ventures with 
foreign companies partly explain the relatively strong performance of the SOE sector. 
3.2.4 SOE reform in Laos 
By the end of the 1980s, the SOE sector in Laos comprised about 640 enterprises and 
accounted for virtually all of the modern industrial sector. SOEs employed about 16,000 
workers, or around 10 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force. Roughly one-third of 
the SOEs in the modern industrial sector were centrally managed, while the rest, which 
were usually smaller, were managed by provincial and district governments. Three-
quarters of the SOEs were engaged in manufacturing, and the others in construction, 
electricity and mining (Otani and Pham 1996). 
Before 1990, the SOE reforms in Laos appeared no different than those in Vietnam 
(Rana 1995). The emphasis was on the granting of greater managerial autonomy to 
SOEs. By March 1988, almost full operating autonomy had been delegated to SOE 
management. SOEs were free to determine their production mix and production totals, 
wages and prices, and investment plans. In the meantime, subsidies and capital transfers 
to SOEs had been terminated. Responding to the changes, some state-owned enterprises 
strategically transformed their financial obligations into overdue debts to the banking 
system and used their autonomy to raise the cash wages of their employees. 
In response to such strategic behaviour and the weak performance of the SOEs, a 
privatization programme was implemented in March 1991. By December 1994, 64 of 
the 200 or so centrally managed SOEs existing in 1989 had been privatized. Dana 
available on 58 of these privatizations show that 78 per cent of the relevant SOEs were 
leased for fixed terms, 19 per cent were sold outright, and 3 per cent were hire 
purchased (that is, payment in instalments). The average value of the SOEs which were 
leased (about $40,000) was higher than that of the SOEs which were sold (around 
$23,000) or that of the SOEs which were hire-purchased (about $3,000). Data available 
on the investors show that 42 per cent of the capital for the relevant privatizations came 
from domestic sources, 26 per cent from joint ventures, and 32 per cent from foreign 
investors. At the provincial level, the sale of SOEs, rather than leasing, seemed to play a 
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more important role. Between 1988 and mid-1993, more than 52 SOEs managed by 
provincial governments were sold, and more than 29 were leased. 
Why did leasing for fixed terms become prevalent in the privatization programme? The 
answer certainly cannot be limited to the government's reluctance to do more. Several 
reasons are listed by Otani and Pham (1996: 47). Leasing may be more politically 
acceptable than outright sales because of a concern among the public that the nation's 
property might be entirely sold off. Because of uncertainty about the value of SOEs and 
about the effectiveness of the economic reforms, the private sector may prefer the less 
risky option of leasing. When alternative modes of privatization are too costly, 
contracting out or leasing to employee collectives becomes practical. If SOEs are 
relatively large or require technology which is more sophisticated than the technology 
domestic sources are able to provide, joint ventures become more attractive. 
Although fixed-term leasing has benefits over the medium run, it can cause problems in 
the long run. Leasing does not involve the transfer of residual control rights, and 
management structures are shifted only for a limited period. These two characteristics 
represent disincentives for long-term investment and even encourage decapitalization 
because, with a average lease period of 15 years, leaseholders may have only a limited 
horizon. From the government perspective, monitoring the leased SOEs is difficult and 
costly. Therefore, refinements in the leases, such as offering to lessees who have 
performed well the priority during future lease negotiations or competitions and other 
more radical reforms will be required. 
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IV OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF TVES IN CHINA 
4.1 The basic paradox of TVEs 
In official statistics in China, 'township and village enterprise' (TVE) covers a wide 
range of ownership categories, including collective ownership by township and village 
communities, private ownership by households and groups of households, joint 
ownership by domestic and foreign investors, and joint ownership by domestic 
shareholders (Table 2). The sector does not include SOEs and enterprises owned by 
urban collectives, although it does include enterprises owned jointly by urban and rural 
enterprises. 
TABLE 2 
THE OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND NUMBER OF RURAL ENTERPRISES IN CHINA, 
BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP, 1994 
Output: 
Employment: 
Number: 
Value (billions yuan) 
Share (%) 
Number (millions) 
Share (%) 
Number (thousands) 
Share (%) 
Total 
4258.85 
100.00 
120.18 
100.00 
24,945 
100.00 
Township 
1504.09 
35.32 
29.61 
24.64 
423 
1.70 
Village 
1382.51 
32.46 
29.38 
24.45 
1,228 
4.92 
Joint* 
111.38 
6.31 
7.71 
7.30 
901.8 
4.31 
Household* 
476.93 
27.00 
46.78 
44.00 
18487.2 
88.39 
Sources: SSB (1995: 363-5); Yearbook of China's Township and Village Enterprises (1993). 
Note: * 1992 figures. Because of the slight decline of the shares of household and jointly owned 
firms from 1992 to 1994, the sum of the shares of each component is slightly greater than 
100. 
In 1994, enterprises owned by townships (xiang ban) contributed 35.3 per cent to the 
gross output value of the TVE sector, and enterprises owned by villages (cun ban) were 
not far behind with a 32.5 per cent output share. Together, these two types of enterprises 
accounted for 49.1 per cent of employment in the sector and produced the dominant 
portion (67.8 per cent) of total output. The individual household-run enterprises 
accounted for 44 per cent of employment and 27 per cent of output. The shares of jointly 
owned private enterprises in both employment and output were quite small. These 
figures suggest that household enterprises tend to be much smaller in scale, but more 
labour intensive, than enterprises owned by township and village communities. 
In the discussion which follows, TVE and TVEs are understood in the narrower sense of 
township and village enterprises only. The ownership characteristics of household-run 
enterprises and other private enterprises, as well as the close links between them and 
TVEs will be analysed in the next section. 
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The range of activities undertaken by township and village enterprises is much broader 
than their name implies. These activities include all 40 industrial categories appearing in 
Chinese statistics, as well as agriculture, construction, transportation and communica-
tions, and commerce and services. Some township and village enterprises have reached 
beyond China to set up joint ventures in Eastern Europe, Russia, Southeast Asia, and the 
US (Wong, Ma and Yang 1995). The shares of one TVE are traded on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (People's Daily [overseas edition] 16 July 1996: 5). 
The annual growth rate of the exports of Township and village enterprises has been 
above 30 per cent since the mid-1980s. Since 1992, TVE exports have accounted for 
over 42 per cent of the national total. TVE exports include textiles, garments, arts and 
crafts, chemicals, machinery, and electronics and communications equipment (The 
Economist 28 November 1992; Yearbook of China's Township and Village Enterprises, 
various years). 
Township and village enterprises also vary in size. For example, in Jiangsu Province in 
May 1996 there were 1,172 TVEs with close to or more than 1,000 employees each. The 
329 large TVE groups officially registered by the Ministry of Agriculture average 183 
million yuan ($22 million) each in total assets, 300 million yuan ($36 million) each in 
annual sales and 32.5 million yuan ($3.9 million) in profits before taxes (Hsingtao 1996: 
A8). 
There is an obvious contradiction between the outstanding performance of township and 
village enterprises and the outcome predicted by traditional property rights theory. As 
pointed out by Weitzman and Xu (1994), first, a typical TVE has no owner in the sense 
of traditional property rights theory. Nominally, township and village enterprises are 
collectively owned by all the members of a community. Moreover, these collective 
owners usually do not have clearly defined shares. Second, there are no residual control 
rights in the traditional sense. 'Owners' must wait passively to enjoy the ownership 
benefits, which mainly take the form of communal social investments. The 'owners' of a 
TVE do not have full rights to use the after-tax income, a majority of which, by law, 
must be used for reinvestment or for social purposes. Third, until recently at least, and in 
most cases, the 'owners' could not sell, inherit or otherwise transfer TVE assets. 
According to traditional property rights theory, township and village enterprises should 
therefore be relatively inefficient, and they should be privatized. 
However, in reality, not only has the growth rate of TVE output been impressive in both 
absolute and relative terms, but the productivity of township and village enterprises has 
also been extraordinary. Although capital-labour ratios among TVEs are only about 25 
per cent of those in the SOE sector, output-labour ratios among TVEs are about 80 per 
cent of those in the state sector. Various estimates place the annual growth rate of the 
total factor productivity of township and village enterprises at between 5 per cent and 
12 per cent for more than a decade. This is outstanding relative to world standards (cf. 
World Bank 1996: 51; Weitzman and Xu 1994; Jefferson and Rawski 1994: 56; Woo et 
al. 1994). Likewise, TVEs have exhibited comparative advantages over private firms in 
China, and their average performance seems to be at least as effective as that of private 
enterprises (Nee 1992; Svejnar 1990; Pitt and Putterman 1992). 
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Why is this so? First, community members do possess the right to derive significant 
short-run and long-run benefits from TVE ownership, if , rather than merely short-run 
financial advantages such as dividends, 'benefits' are understood in the larger sense of 
job opportunities, job security, pension funds, and communal welfare programmes in 
housing, health care, irrigation, road construction, and other infrastructure. 
Second, although the residual control rights exercised by a community government may 
imply a certain amount of risk of bureaucratization, the control by government over the 
implementation and coordination of internal reorganization or over the takeover process 
does sidestep the social and economic costs of bankruptcy through court action or of 
takeover by outsiders. This control is quite similar to that exercised by the main bank in 
a Japanese Keiretsu. 
Third, because it is a fixed economic entity, the community, unlike a specific TVE, can 
shoulder unlimited liability. Under the pressure of intense competition, this ability can 
facilitate a consensus among community members, the community government and 
TVE management and workers to maximize profits even by means of the sacrifice of all 
or part of wage income. Moreover, because a community is diversified in an economic-
sense, it can diversify the business risk. A township or village can rather easily create 
several small-scale township and village enterprises in manufacturing, agriculture, 
commerce, construction, and transportation and then expand the size of these TVEs. 
Fourth, because the community is a small society, the citizenry can participate quite 
directly in discussions with community leaders. This clearly contributes to the solution 
of the problem of monitoring the monitors and helps reduce the cost of organization. 
Finally, because the community is the corporation, the responsibility contract and 
subcontract system can be easily arranged between the community representative 
assemblies and the community government, between the government and the TVEs, and 
within the TVEs. These contracts and subcontracts have facilitated the solution of 
monitoring problems within the community and within the township and village 
enterprises. 
For the large-scale TVEs which require access to domestic and international capital 
markets, a further clarification of property rights may be necessary. However, this does 
not mean that the only alternative is the distribution of shares among individuals. The 
community as a collective equity holder and the community government as the 
executive equity holder may still possess comparative advantages. Even if each citizen 
becomes a shareholder, it may still be more efficient if the community government can 
act as the representative of local shareholders in the exercise of their residual control 
rights over the TVEs (Vermeer 1996). 
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4.2 The right to derive benefit from TVE property 
The right to derive benefit from property provides a strong and spontaneous incentive to 
the owners of the property and thus is considered an essential dimension of ownership. 
From a static viewpoint, it is difficult to identify the claimants to the residual benefits of 
a TVE. However, from a dynamic perspective, it becomes fairly clear that the most 
significant benefits generated by a TVE are enjoyed by the community members via the 
community government (Chang and Wang 1994). 
TABLE 3 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SALES INCOME AND PROFITS OF A FISHING GEAR 
ENTERPRISE, 1991 
Item 
Sales 
Total product cost (a 
Sales tax 
Value added tax 
Urban construction tax 
Administration fee 
Profit from sales (b 
Other revenue 
Other expenditures 
Gross profit (c 
Enterprise fund 
New product development fund 
Retained profit, recycled products 
Loan repayments 
Community expenditures 
Education contribution 
Taxable profit (d 
Income tax 
Energy and transportation fund 
Budgetary regulatory fund (e 
Other levies by town government 
Tax exemption rebate Q 
Net profit (9 
Profit delivery 
Profit retention (n 
Enterprise development fund 
Welfare fund 
Value (1,000 yuan) 
21,560 
17,850 
680 
660 
30 
110 
2,230 
20 
240 
2,010 
50 
130 
20 
1,510 
30 
80 
230 
110 
13 
18 
22 
81 
148 
30 
118 
89 
29 
Share (%) 
100.0 
82.8 
3.2 
3.1 
0.1 
0.5 
10.3 
100.0 
2.5 
64.7 
1.0 
75.1 
1.5 
4.0 
100.0 
47.8 
5.7 
7.8 
9.6 
35.2 
100.0 
20.3 
100.0 
75.4 
24.6 
Destination 
State 
State 
Town government 
Town government 
Enterprise 
Enterprise 
Bank 
Town government 
Town government 
State 
State 
State 
Town government 
Town government 
Enterprise 
Enterprise 
Enterprise 
Source: Wong, Ma and Yang (1995: Tables 3.4 and 3.5). 
Notes to Table 3: 
(a Total product cost refers to the factory production cost (mainly material inputs and wage costs), plus 
the sales-related costs such as shipping, packaging, advertising and other marketing expenses 
(b Profit from sales = (sales) - (total product cost) - (sales tax) - (value added tax) - (tax for urban 
construction) - (administrative fee). 
<c Gross profit = (profit from sales) + (other revenue) - (other expenditure). 
(d Taxable profit = (gross profit) - (enterprise fund) - (new product development fund) + (retained profit 
from recycled products) - (loan repayments) - (community expenditures) - (education contribution). 
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Notes to Table 3 (cont): 
(e The budgetary regulatory fund is actually a sort of income tax which is set according to county 
government fiscal budgetary regulations. 
(f The tax exemption rebate is available because the municipal government made the county in which 
the enterprise is located into a special economic zone. 
(9 Net profit = (taxable profit) - (income tax) - (energy and transportation fund) - (budgetary regulatory 
fund) - (other levies by the town government) + (tax exemption rebate). 
(h Profit retention = (net profit) - (profit delivery) = (enterprise development fund) + (welfare fund). 
For example, one might look at the distribution of the sales income and profits from a 
township enterprise specializing in fishing gear (Table 3). The distribution pattern is 
shaped by various forces, such as the regulations set by governments at different levels 
and the clauses of contracts negotiated between the town government and the enterprise 
managers. Table 3 shows clearly that the town government received revenue at every 
stage of enterprise operations. First, from the total sales of the enterprise, it collected 
110,000 yuan as administrative fees and 30,000 yuan as taxes for the urban construction 
fund. Then, from the gross profit of the enterprise, it took 30,000 yuan for community 
outlays and 80,000 yuan for education. From the taxable profit, it received 22,000 yuan 
for 'other levies'. Finally, it took 30,000 for 'profit delivery' from the net profits of the 
enterprise. From the firm, the town government received a total of 302,000 yuan, which 
was equal to almost three times the profit retention (118,000 yuan) of the enterprise and 
a little more than the sum of the amounts accruing to the enterprise fund, the new 
product development fund and profit retention (298,000 yuan). Thus, a majority of the 
financial benefits generated by the TVE went directly to the community government. 
The revenues obtained by the community government are used for at least three 
purposes: to establish new township and village enterprises or to subsidize loss-making 
but solvent TVEs, to finance communal social programmes and infrastructure projects, 
such as education and health care services, pension funds and the construction of roads 
and irrigation systems, and to support government operations, which often cover 
benefits enjoyed by government officials, including comfortable offices, banquets, 
generous travel allowances, and government cars for private use. Because most 
community members, including most local officials and their families, live in the same 
township or village for their entire lives, they can benefit from the social and economic 
development projects (Chang and Wang 1994: 440-1). 
According to central government regulations (Ministry of Agriculture of China 1990), at 
least 60 per cent of the profit retained by the enterprise should go to the enterprise 
development fund. In the case of the fishing gear enterprise, this share was 75.4 per cent 
in 1991, well above the requirement. In addition, both the enterprise fund and the new 
product development fund, which accounted for more than 1.6 times the amount of the 
profit retained, were used mainly for technical innovation and the expansion of 
production. The development preferences of this enterprise were not particularly special. 
The entire sample of TVEs discussed in Wong, Ma and Yang (1995) showed similar 
preferences. Most of the township and village enterprises in this sample held back a 
portion of wages until the month before the Chinese New Year. They used these extra 
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funds as working capital. Such practices have been observed by other researchers (e.g. 
Pei 1996; Byrd and Lin 1990). The explanation of TVE managers is quite concise: 'If we 
don't focus on technical innovation and accumulation, our factory may not survive in the 
near future, and our local workers may lose their jobs and wages from industrial 
production.' This is such a strong view that the TVE sector has taken off from scratch. 
Again, the members of the local community benefit most from these development funds 
(Chang and Wang 1994). First, the development of township and village enterprises 
improves job security for the TVE workers, most of whom are community members. 
Second, the expansion of TVEs provides new job opportunities for other community 
members or their relatives in neighbouring communities. Because there is a significant 
surplus of labour in the agricultural sector, the increase in job opportunities means that 
the township and village enterprises have come to play the most important role in 
absorbing surplus labour and in raising the living standards of rural populations. Third, 
because of the participation of community governments in TVE and also in social 
programmes, greater TVE income also implies expanded social programmes. 
4.3 The residual control rights exercised by community governments 
For the purpose of understanding the extent to which community governments have 
exercised residual control rights over township and village enterprises, it helps to look at 
a larger bundle of control rights and to compare the allocation of these rights to 
community governments and TVEs with the allocation of such rights to governments 
and SOEs. Table 4 outlines the allocation of control rights along eleven dimensions for 
both TVEs and SOEs in 1991. The Table is based on a World Bank enterprise survey 
covering approximately 950 state-owned enterprises and 300 township and village 
enterprises. 
Table 4 shows that there is no essential difference in the allocation of control rights 
between TVEs and SOEs, although TVEs appear to enjoy proportionally more 
autonomy over the majority of the items. For some residual control indicators, for 
instance, for the hiring and replacement of managers (Table 4, first item) or the 
allocation of management contracts (Table 5), there is no real appreciable difference 
between TVEs and SOEs. Virtually all of the state-owned enterprises and about 80 per 
cent of the township and village enterprises were operating under some type of 
management contract (Jefferson, Zhao and Lu 1995: 6).17 Both TVEs and SOEs are 
severely limited in their authority to appoint upper-level managers. Such appointments 
lire typically made by government bodies which consult little with management. This 
indicates that, as in the SOE sector, community governments exercise residual control 
rights over their TVEs. They hire and replace managers, allocate contracts for the 
leasing of community assets, and make the ultimate decision to open or close a TVE or 
shift the activities of a TVE (cf. Byrd and Lin 1990; Chang and Wang 1994; Oi 1996; 
Pei 1996; Wong, Ma and Yang 1995). 
1
' Note that 'TVE' in this survey does not include household-run enterprises and other type of private 
enterprises. In the TVE sector, the next most popular approach to the management contract is the lease. 
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TABLE 4 
THE ALLOCATION OF KEY DECISION RIGHTS, 1991 
(in % of total respondents)* 
Allocation of key decision rights TVE SOE 
Appoint leaders: 
Recruit employees: 
Dismiss employees: 
Investment decisions: 
Set bonus level: 
Set wage differentials: 
Set bonus differentials: 
Set production plan: 
Authority to set prices: 
enterprise 
consultation 
supervisory agency 
enterprise 
consultation 
supervisory agency 
enterprise 
consultation 
supervisory agency 
enterprise 
consultation 
supervisory agency 
enterprise 
consultation 
supervisory agency 
enterprise 
consultation 
supervisory agency 
enterprise 
consultation 
supervisory agency 
enterprise 
consultation 
supervisory agency 
no limit 
somewhat limited 
completely limited 
Authority to choose customers: no limit 
somewhat limited 
completely limited 
Authority to choose suppliers: no limit 
somewhat limited 
completely limited 
Number of observations 
15.8 
24.2 
60.0 
66.7 
29.8 
3.5 
72.2 
23.6 
4.2 
24.5 
59.6 
16.0 
54.4 
27.0 
18.6 
79.2 
11.7 
9.2 
86.9 
8.2 
5.0 
57.7 
20.4 
21.8 
66.6 
23.3 
10.1 
90.2 
4.9 
4.9 
90.2 
6.3 
3.5 
1.1 
17.9 
80.9 
22.6 
50.0 
27.4 
62.8 
26.4 
10.8 
14.4 
57.1 
28.6 
62.8 
18.2 
18.9 
43.6 
19.8 
43.6 
93.3 
4.4 
2.3 
28.8 
43.6 
27.6 
19.6 
54.1 
26.3 
75.1 
19.8 
5.0 
71.3 
24.6 
4.2 
282-85 915-30 
Source: Jefferson, Zhao and Lu (1995: Table 1). 
Note: * The first figure in each group ('enterprise') represents the percentage of respondents 
indicating that the enterprise makes the decision by itself; the second ('consultation') 
represents the percentage of firms reporting that the enterprise and the supervisory agency 
decide jointly, and the third ('supervisory agency') represents the percentage of firms 
indicating that the supervisory body makes the decision. 
Based on Grossman and Hart (1986), Chang and Wang (1994: 443-6) suggest that the 
control rights of community governments over township and village enterprises 
represent an arrangement which generates more benefits at lower cost than would a 
similar arrangement involving community members or higher levels of government (i.e. 
county and above). The key resource of community members is their labour, which is 
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abundant and easily replaceable. Pooling the financial resources of individual citizens 
(jizi) may be difficult to accomplish without the power and reputation of a community 
government. In addition, private citizens have almost no access to the monopoly state 
banking system. Together these factors imply that the exercise by community members 
of control rights would not have many significant benefits, whereas the costs associated 
with such an arrangement may be high and varied. Meanwhile, all the benefits 
associated with control by community governments would be lost. If higher levels of 
government had control over the TVEs, as they do over many SOEs, they would 
certainly be able to take advantage of all the benefits which community governments 
enjoy, but at the cost of the soft-budget constraint. Moreover, the 'agency' problem 
would be more serious than it is in the case of state-owned enterprises. 
TABLE 5 
SIGNATORIES TO MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS, 1991 
(in % of total respondents) 
TVEs SOEs 
Director 24.0 66.0 
Group of managers 65.0 17.0 
All employees 8.0 16.0 
Others 3.0 1.0 
Number of observations 231 866 
Source: Jefferson, Zhao and Lu (1995: Table 2). 
Three critical contributions of community governments to TVEs are outlined by Chang 
and Wang (1994: 443-4). First, because township and village governments are part of a 
large government system with broad powers and because of the long tradition of 
authoritarian government in China, the full support of township and village government 
can provide community members and other TVE stakeholders with the sense of security 
they need to achieve long-term development. Second, township and village governments 
can offer managerial inputs to township and village enterprises in several ways. Because 
the market is in its infancy and ordinary citizens who have suitable market-oriented 
talents are a scare resource, township and village governments are essential in the 
organization of major economic and political activities within their jurisdictions. 
Without a market or other social mechanisms, township and village governments are 
often the only available local institutions with the authority to settle disputes which arise 
in the process of the creation of township and village enterprises. Third, township and 
village governments can play an essential role in gaining access to outside resources, 
particularly bank loans. 
One might add that township and village governments have close ties with township and 
village corporations and in most cases function as the executive bodies of these 
corporations. From a dynamic perspective, these corporations bear an unlimited liability, 
that is, the debts of a township or village are the responsibility of the collective. It is a 
popular practice that, if a TVE fails and defaults on its loans, the debt is paid off by the 
other township and village enterprises in the community, regardless of the specifics of 
the contracting system (for instance, see Lin 1995; Oi 1996; Wong, Ma and Yang 1995). 
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The township and village governments are not only the guarantors of TVE loans, but 
also the executors of the collective financing and debt repayment system. This collective 
financing and debt repayment system represents another support for TVE growth. All 
the funds required for the start-up of a new TVE can be borrowed from existing 
township and village enterprises with the help of the township and village governments 
government (Wong, Ma and Yang 1995). This system also offers township and village 
governments the power to initiate and coordinate internal reorganizations or takeovers 
so that communities can avoid the social and economic costs of bankruptcy actions and 
of takeovers by outsiders. 
4.4 Beyond the notion of property rights 
In China, central, provincial, municipal, prefecture, and county governments all have 
sufficient authority to regulate the market through administrative methods and to be 
involved in credit decisions through both vertical and regional accountability ('dual 
coordination'). Ex ante, governments at the level of the county or above are directly 
involved in the formulation of credit plans and can direct specialized banks to make 
loans. Ex post, governments have the authority to decide whether state-owned 
enterprises should pay back the loans. 
Township and village governments have no such authority. A township or village 
government cannot protect its TVEs by means of the erection of trade barriers to keep 
out competition, simply because the market within a community is usually too small and 
limited to be meaningful for the development of even one firm. Township and village 
governments have no access to the state banking system, because all townships and 
villages are historically institutionalized as part of the traditional rural sector, whereas 
the banking system is a part of the modern urban sector. Likewise, all staff members cf 
state banks are registered in the urban residency registration system and have no links 
with the rural sector except through business dealings. 
As a consequence, state banks have basically followed commercial principles in making 
loans to township and village enterprises. They ask township and village governments to 
act as guarantors of investment loans. If a township or village has a poor record in credit 
repayment, state banks can refuse the loan application of a community and can also 
withhold interest payments and some of the principal from the bank accounts of the 
community or its TVEs. Township and village governments understand full well that 
communities may be able to delay debt-repayments over the short term, but that the)' 
cannot delay them indefinitely. Meanwhile, a poor credit record implies that the; 
community must depend on self-financing for future development and debt servicing. 
This is not possible even in agricultural communities, for which bank credits are needed 
seasonally for the purchase of agricultural inputs such as seeds, chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides. 
Township and village corporations bear unlimited liability in a broad, dynamic sense 
and face constant competition. This makes township and village governments 
significantly different from governments at higher levels and helps one understand the 
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comparative advantage acquired by a community which acts as a corporation and 
establishes small diversified industries. By acting as a corporation in the organization of 
collective financing and debt servicing, a community can substantially reduce the risks 
faced by individual TVEs and by the community as a whole. The decisive role of 
township and village governments in the initiation and coordination of internal 
reorganizations and takeovers eliminates the risk of bankruptcy actions and of takeovers 
by outsiders. Thus, in reaction to the belt-tightening in 1989 and 1990, several million 
TVEs were closed down or taken over by other TVEs (People's Daily [overseas edition] 
23 March 1990; Rohwer 1992). Nevertheless, apparently none were declared bankrupt 
by the courts.18 In contrast, the losses among SOEs soared, although only a handful of 
small ones went bankrupt. A 120 billion yuan credit relief operation was initiated in the 
fourth quarter of 1989 to write off non-performing inter-enterprise credits, mainly inter-
SOE credits (Portyakov 1991). 
More secure property rights, unlimited liability, and market competition together 
provide incentives, but also the pressure for township and village corporations to 
perform well. As a consequence, the contract and subcontract system or the multi-layer 
responsibility system is commonly adopted as a mechanism to solve internal monitoring 
problems. The case of Daquizhuang village, which is well summarized in Lin (1995), is 
an excellent example. This village is located around 50 kilometres southeast of Tianjin 
in the northeastern plain. The first village factory was built in 1978 with initial funding 
of 150,000 yuan. By 1989 the village had 117 factories in 20 industries that produced 
more than 300 products, and total assets were valued at 360 million yuan (about $90 
million). By mid-1992, the number of village enterprises stood at 260. The entire village 
is organized as a corporation and since 1987 has used the name Daquizhuang 
Agricultural-Industrial-Commercial United Corporation. 
The internal management system of this united corporation is a multi-layered, multi-
responsibility system. This means that each layer is responsible for the next lower layer 
and to the next higher layer. The united corporation monitors only those corporations 
which are one level below it, including four industrial companies and other companies 
in commerce, agriculture, construction, science and technology development, and social 
services (e.g. schools and hospitals). Each company administers the units at the next 
lower level in a similar way. 
Two specific features of the system are worth particular mention. First, the enterprises 
a.re operated not by individual corporate actors, but by corporate families. Thanks to the 
strict responsibility system, such an arrangement reduces internal conflicts, strengthens 
collective efficiency and does not lead to significant free-riding. Vital information is 
kept confidential vis-a-vis the external competitive environment. This enhances the 
competitive position of the corporation in markets. Second, while the core organizations 
and enterprises are uniformly local, the corporation can employ more external resources 
(labour, technicians and finance) and even cooperate with other enterprises. Overall 
i S
 According to one source, 32 bankruptcy cases reached court nationwide in 1990. This was fewer than 
the number in 1989. All of the cases in 1990 apparently involved only SOEs and urban collective 
enterprises (China Information Daily, 18 March 1994: 2). 
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authority is local. Top management has emerged from among local staff or is selected 
from local families. Though such an arrangement may hinder the equality of 
opportunity, it certainly greatly reduces the 'agency' problem. 
Township and village government leaders act as supervisors within the corporation. The 
response to the question of who monitors these monitors is essential for organizational 
efficiency. One important source of inefficiency among SOEs is the fact that nobody can 
effectively supervise the government bureaucracies which act as the monitors. However, 
among TVEs the story is different. 
Direct, semi-competitive elections have been held since the mid-1980s for local 
government officials in wealthier villages and in those villages in which TVEs represent 
a large segment of the economy. These villages are considered by the central 
government as up-to-standard demonstration villages. They accounted for about 15 per 
cent of the total of 900,000 villages in 1990 (O'Brien 1994: 47 and 51; The Economist 
2 November 1996: 81-3). Village representative assemblies (cunmin daibiao huiyi) are 
also active in these demonstration villages. These assemblies can review important 
financial decisions made by the elected village committees, including industrial and 
agricultural plans, contracts, budget issues, construction decisions, the use of collective 
property, the allocation of relief funds, and the deployment of donated labour. In many 
places, the assemblies must be consulted if an outlay exceeds a certain fixed amount 
(O'Brien 1994: 45). 
The advantages of the TVE ownership and governance structure are only relative. Man}' 
serious problems exist that may be linked to this structure. Among them, two are often 
pointed out. First, township and village governments are not purely economic actors. As: 
TVEs mature, the objectives of township and village government officials are coming; 
increasingly into conflict with those of TVE managers, although initially these two sets 
of objectives were quite similar (cf. Ren et al. 1990; Wang 1990). Township and village 
governments have assigned priority to raising employment, local prosperity and 
financial revenue. This could hinder the stable, long-term development of township and 
village enterprises. The powerful control rights of township and village governments 
could thus lead to unfavourable interference into TVE management. Township and 
village governments also seem to be shifting the responsibility for the overall 
development of rural communities onto TVEs. As a result, many TVEs are now also 
experiencing redundant employment and increasingly heavy social burdens. In this, they 
are becoming quite similar to SOEs in many ways (Byrd and Lin 1990: 125, 304 and 
351; China Information Daily 2 August 1993: 2). 
Second, TVE development has been closely tied to local initiative and local conditions. 
As a result, rural industrialization has not yet been accompanied by urbanization, and 
the distribution of rural industries throughout the country has been uneven and is rather 
disorganized. This has serious negative implications for the future development of 
TVEs. Many TVEs have already been restricted by the lack of infrastructure, market 
information and social services and by poor transportation and communication 
networks. At the macroeconomic level, this suggests that land use and the development 
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of the service industry are inefficient and that there is the risk that environmental 
pollution may go unchecked in certain localities (Chen 1993: 207-15). 
The existence of such problems means that there is a need for further clarification in 
TVE property rights so that the environment for TVE growth can become as favourable 
as possible. However, the process of clarification will probably follow an adaptive 
evolutionary path rather than rely on mass privatization (Vermeer 1996). 
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V PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN EAST ASIA 
The private and household enterprise sector has experienced very dramatic growth 
during the reform years in China and Vietnam. For example, in industry in Vietnam the 
share of private and household enterprises in the total rose from 14.5 per cent in 1987 to 
23.3 per cent in 1990 and 26.1 per cent in 1993, while in China the corresponding share 
climbed from 1.8 per cent in 1985 to 5.4 per cent in 1990 and 12.9 per cent in 1995 
(Table 6).19 
TABLE 6 
PRIVATE AND HOUSEHOLD INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN VIETNAM AND CHINA 
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 
Vietnam 
Number (units) 
Private enterprises -- 490 1,284 959 3,322 25,000 
Household enterprises -- -- 333,337 446,771 452,866 
Share in industrial output (%) -- 14.5 22.0 26.7 26.1 
China 
Number (1,000s) 3,348 5,553 6,124 6,387 7,971 
Share in industrial output (%) 1JJ 3fi 43 ^0 8 j * 12J 
Sources: Vietnam: Dodsworth et al. (1996: 45); General Statistics Office (1996); China: SSB (1991: 391), 
SSB (1995: 375); SSB (1996: 401). 
Three types of enterprise can be distinguished in the sector: household enterprises, rural 
private enterprises and urban private enterprises. Household enterprises make up over 
95 per cent of the total. Most of these do piecework for SOEs, TVEs and other 
'corporate' organizations. This integration of public enterprises (SOEs and TVEs) and 
household 'workshops' on the basis of strict contracts has benefited both sides. 
Private enterprises which have grown beyond family-based entities nearly always 
require local government support in order to obtain raw materials, land, equipment, 
funds, contacts, and access to regional and national markets. This support is typically 
supplied partly in exchange for a share in both residual benefits rights and residual 
control rights. 
*
y
 The official data probably do not capture all private industrial activity in either country, as data are 
collected only from private and household enterprises which are registered, although not all private 
activities are registered. In the case of China, the situation is further complicated because of the existence 
of the 'three fears' {san pa) - the fear that policy might change, the fear of public criticism, and the fear of 
risk - and because of tax and other preferential treatment given to TVEs. Private enterprises may therefore 
be registered as collectives (that is, they may 'wear the red hat'). However, this under-reporting has no 
significant effect on the analysis in this paper, because even a private enterprise which is registered a:5 
such is bound to require support from community authorities and in many ways will thus act like an> other 
community enterprise. 
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The difference between these private enterprises and the typical private enterprise in a 
capitalist economy was well understood by the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China in the early years of the reform. 
Of enterprises which are currently exceeding regulation employment 
numbers, some have implemented systems different from private 
enterprises (siren qiye), for example, taking a certain proportion of after-
tax profits to be invested in collective assets; regulating the limits of 
dividends and owners' income; issuing a certain amount of profit to 
workers, etc. These thus have elements of [a] co-operative economy to 
varying degrees. We should help them continue to improve, and they may 
be treated differently from capitalist employers (State Bureau of 
Industrial and Commercial Administration and Theoretical Department, 
Beijing Daily \9S4). 
The rural private enterprises appear more like the wider community enterprises in which 
township and village governments have established informal but effective proprietary 
interests (Young 1994). On the other hand, the ties between the urban entrepreneurs who 
operate private enterprises and the officials staffing state administrative, distributive and 
production entities appear more like patron-client relationships (Wank 1996). 
A large body of literature exists on these enterprises (for instance, see Byrd and Lin 
1990; Ho 1994; Liu 1992; Nee 1992; Odgaard 1990; Parris 1993). The majority of the 
literature is implicitly or explicitly based on an ontological commitment to a standard 
neo-classical typology of markets as an exchange system for perfect property rights 
which are enforced by law and for relatively costless transactions for the acquisition of 
information. Anything else is identified as a deviation, which is therefore partial, 
unstable and transitory. 
However, if one accepts the theoretical framework of this paper (cf. Section II), 
institutionalization is an inherently political process because it affects the distribution 
among groups of the power to advance institutional preferences, and institutional change 
is a path-dependent process. Therefore, existing institutionalized constraints and 
organizational patterns are not neutral, but impose a bias in the choices of economic 
actors and in the outcomes of their actions. Based on this recognition, we may need to 
shift our attention from the ontological discussion to an investigation of the dynamic 
process. Concretely, we should analyse the following questions: How might one favour 
stable expectations for long-term investment and the development of private enterprises 
rather than the uncertainty which can arise from the haphazard enforcement of laws and 
regulations by agents of the state? Can channels for inter-regional information exchange 
be identified? How can social trust and morality be used to facilitate resource allocation, 
stable expectations and information flows? While a functioning market economy is 
popularly understood as a system of well-defined property rights and legal structures, an 
understanding of the ways in which social trust can institutionally undergird market 
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activity would certainly generate new insights into institutional plurality in market 
economies.20 
In China and Vietnam, in both of which the bureaucracy is the dominant integrative 
structure in the social order, the social trust embodied in a community or a patron-client 
relationship is not readily transferable by one actor to another community entity or 
relationship. This fact enhances the likelihood of ongoing future cooperation and an 
orientation towards mutual benefit. As a consequence, social trust in this form, like 
property rights, is productive. It enables actors to calculate risks and likely returns, 
encourages business activity by creating the reasonable expectation that others involved 
in the relationship will behave in a fairly predictable way, and tends to foster much more 
business activity than alternative forms, including the absence of this type of social trust. 
This social trust links entrepreneurs with the overarching bureaucratic structure. The 
connection cannot be viewed simply as a localized exchange of commercial wealth for 
bureaucratic power. Its contribution to productivity and marketization may be much 
more significant. From the perspective of private entrepreneurs, the connection provides 
local stability in an environment characterized by central policy instabilities arid 
ideological hostility. At the same time, it offers private entrepreneurs institutionalized 
access to crucial resources such as bank credits, land and key raw materials, many of 
which are directly or indirectly controlled by government. From the perspective of local 
governments and officials, the connection institutionalizes new sources of revenue to 
cope with the increasing expenditure and development pressure (Li 1996; Wank 199(3; 
Wong 1995). 
The major contribution of patron-client ties is stylized as the stimulation of competition, 
support for innovation, the reduction of uncertainty, and the facilitation of market 
linkages (Leff 1964; Wank 1996). This stylized contribution may be more suited for the 
ties between rural private enterprises and community governments. 
Competition takes place among private entrepreneurs, as well as among government 
entities and officials. Private entrepreneurs compete against each other for bureaucratic 
favours that are in short supply, including business licences and dispensations from 
restrictions on access to the commodities which private businesses trade. The licences 
and dispensations are usually renewed on an annual basis, enabling annual cost 
adjustments. This assures that in the long run only the most productive entities can meet 
the payment requirements (including bribes). 
Competition takes place among bureaucratic actors because bureaucratic resources are 
generally abundant, inducing better service even at the fringes. For instance, although 
the state does not authorize private companies to engage in direct foreign trade, state-
owned foreign trade companies have sometimes provided a cover so that private firms 
l(i
 The institutional plurality in market economies like Japan and the US has attracted the attention of 
social economists. For instance, because they are considered more easily adaptable to volatile markets, 
personal contracts are popularly employed in Japan, despite the availability of legal contracts and a legal 
system (Dore 1983). In the US, for the sake of saving time and costs, sales representatives often settle? 
deals with a handshake rather than by contract (Macaulay 1963). 
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can engage in direct foreign trade. This has represented a practical means for coping 
with fluctuations in supply and demand and for beating out other state foreign trade 
companies (Wank 1996). 
In order to stimulate and support innovation, such ties must induce reform from below. 
According to the 'individual business family' policy implemented in China in the late 
1970s, a private firm could not expand its business beyond seven employees and beyond 
the use of vehicle transport. Many local governments circumvented this policy by 
allowing private firms to register as collectives. Without such a practice, the 
significance of private business in job creation, the generation of fiscal revenue and the 
elimination of gaps in supply and demand might not have been recognized by the state 
and the public by 1984 (cf. Liu 1992; Parris 1993; Wank 1996; Young 1994). 
The ties between private entrepreneurs and local government entities and officials have 
reduced the political uncertainties which used to follow political and policy cycles. They 
have thereby encouraged investment and the diversification away from speculative trade 
and towards services and industrial production. Because private firms can use these ties 
to obtain the officially-mediated resources which enhance profits and security, they are 
motivated to develop these ties as new market channels. As a consequence, private firms 
have sometimes helped public units market their products, provided production inputs 
for them and infused capital through public-private partnerships. They have thus helped 
public enterprises 'grow out of the plan' (Naughton 1995; Probert and Young 1995; 
Wank 1996). 
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VI CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has illuminated the dynamic processes of SOE property rights reform in 
China, Vietnam and Laos, the comparative advantages of China's TVE ownership, 
governance and liability structures, and the way private enterprises in China and 
Vietnam expand business through social trust because of their participation in 
community enterprises or their patron-client ties with government entities and officials. 
The paper has avoided an ontological discussion focusing on a standard neo-classical 
typology of functioning markets in order to undertake an investigation of the dynamic 
development processes and the functional rationalities of unorthodox ownership and 
governance structures in East Asia. 
Table 7 summarizes the approach of this paper in three panels. Panel 1 outlines the 
ownership features of major types of firms in East Asia relative to the corresponding 
features of large Japanese firms (J-firms) and large American corporations (A-firms). 
Panel 2 compares the liability and governance features of these firms. Panel 3 presents a 
brief remark on the performance of these firms wherein performance is valued in 
relative terms rather than in absolute terms. 
The ownership structure may shape fundamental features of the liability and governance 
structure of a firm. However, it cannot fully determine the liability and governance 
structure. For example, SOEs with management contracts and SOEs with leasing 
contracts show quite similar ownership structures, but the latter have a relatively hard 
budget constraint and a less serious agency problem than the former, and as a 
consequence the latter usually perform more effectively. 
The relative efficiency of different type of firms seems to be more directly and closely 
linked with the liability and governance structures, in which the hardness of the budget 
constraint, the genuine fear of bankruptcy, the effective monitoring of the monitors, and 
the existence of compatible incentives for management to reduce agency problems are 
key dimensions. Within the same general type of state ownership, the management 
contract system resulted in a performance which was better than that of the SOEs 
directly controlled by government entities. Meanwhile, the leasing contract system arc! 
joint ventures, particularly with foreign investors, have exhibited improved 
performance. City-run SOEs transformed into full employee stock-ownership enterprises 
have had impressive success in China, and the approach may be implemented 
nationwide, especially among medium-size SOEs in the near future. 
The excellent performance of TVEs may be attributed to such factors as the compatible 
interests and incentives among community members, township and village governments 
and TVE management, the almost unlimited liability in a dynamic sense that is borne by 
the community as a whole, the intense competitive pressure, and the fact that township 
and village governments are effectively monitored by community representative 
assemblies, as well as by community members whether informally or formally. These 
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liability and governance features of TVEs are mainly due to the TVE ownership 
structure and the marketization of the economy. Private enterprises in East Asia show 
hybrid features of the TVE type and of classical private firms. 
For a better understanding of the plurality of ownership arrangements in East Asia, as 
well as in the Western capitalist economies, one might distinguish between ownership 
of the firm and ownership of the asset. Ownership of the asset is equivalent to the 
classical concept of property rights, including the right to utilize a specified asset, the 
right to capture benefits from the asset, and the alienation right over the asset. 
Ownership of the firm refers to the claim right to residual returns and the residual 
control right. For example, when creditors and shareholders are both the owners of the 
financial capital of a firm, the creditor gets contract-specified benefits (interests) from 
his capital and usually has no residual control right or residual benefits right. Therefore, 
he cannot be identified as one of the owners of the firm. In contrast, a shareholder has a 
claim to residual benefits, possesses a right to residual control, must bear the risks 
entailed in the exercise of these rights, and is generally identified as one of the owners 
of the firm. 
Thus, we can view the firm as a nexus of contracts among various asset owners. These 
asset owners include not only the shareholders and creditors who are owners of the 
financial capital and the workers and managers who are owners of their human capital, 
but also certain government agents who may own or have monopoly control over 
specific, non-marketable institutional and social capital. The actual allocation of residual 
control rights and rights to residual benefits among these asset owners is dependent or 
contingent on the state rather than unique or deterministic. For instance, in a typical 
Ccipitalist economy, the concrete ownership arrangements for a firm may consist of a 
partnership whereby all the members of the firm share residual benefits and residual 
control rights; it may consist in the hiring of labour by capital whereby capitalists 
exercise the residual control rights and enjoy the residual benefits, or it may consist in 
the employment of capital by labour whereby workers enjoy the residual control rights 
and the residual benefits rights. Even in a stock company the concrete ownership 
arrangement is contingent on the state. If the business does well, the shareholders are the 
owners of the company. If the company fails to repay its debts, the creditors may take it 
over and become the owners. If the company fails to pay the contracted wages to its 
employees, these would become the creditors and thus the owners with the right to 
exercise residual control and receive the residual benefits (Blair 1995; Hart 1995). 
The basic logic behind this state-contingent ownership is the value-maximization 
principle of the firm, according to which the optimal ownership arrangement of the firm 
should match the right to residual benefits with the residual control rights. In other 
words, the risk-makers should be the risk-takers (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 291-3). 
Taking into consideration the monitoring and agency problems which exist under 
conditions of asymmetric information, the allocation of partial or full ownership rights 
in a firm to the most important actors in the development of the firm can effectively 
reduce the cost of monitoring and the problem of moral hazard and thus maximize the 
match between the residual control rights and the right to the residual benefits. 
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TABLE 7 
THE FEATURES OF HETERODOX OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES VERSUS THE J-FIRM AND THE A-FIRM * 
4*. 
ON 
Nominal owner 
Control right 
Major beneficiaries 
Alienation right 
Budget constraint 
Subject to bankruptcy 
Who monitors the 
monitors? 
Agency problem 
Average performance 
(relative efficiency) 
Management 
contract 
All citizens 
Government 
Government 
and citizens 
Government 
Soft 
No 
No-one 
Most serious 
Poor 
SOEs in the reform 
Leasing 
contract 
All citizens 
Government 
Government 
and citizens 
Government 
Relatively hard 
Yes 
No-one 
Less serious 
Good 
Employee 
stock 
ownership 
All employees 
Shareholder 
assembly 
All employees 
Employees 
and 
government 
Hard 
Yes 
Shareholder 
assembly 
Moderate 
Excellent 
Joint ventures 
Citizens and 
partners 
Government 
and partners 
All three 
groups 
Government 
and partners 
Relatively hard 
Not certain 
Not clear 
Less serious 
Very good 
TVEs 
Community 
members 
TVG 
Citizens and 
TVG 
Citizen 
assembly and 
TVG 
Hard for whole 
community 
Yes, but not 
by court 
Assembly of 
citizen 
representative 
Moderate 
Excellent 
Private firms in 
East Asia 
Private owners 
Owners and 
local 
government 
Owners and 
community 
Owners and 
local 
government 
Hard 
Yes 
Owners 
Not present 
Excellent 
J-firm 
Shareholders 
Workers and 
managers 
Workers and 
managers 
All three 
groups 
Relatively hard 
Yes 
Shareholders 
Moderate 
Very good 
A-firm 
Shareholders 
Managers 
Shareholders 
Shareholders 
and managers 
Relatively hard 
Yes 
Shareholders 
Less serious 
Very good 
CD 
c 
CO 0. 
ID 
c 
co 
Q. 
CO 
c 
co 
TVG - township and viiiage yovernment 
One may conclude that the value-maximization principle will push SOEs with 
management contracts to seek an arrangement involving leasing, joint ventures, 
employee stock ownership, and other hybrid forms of the shareholding company. TVEs 
have their own specific ownership and governance structures, which have helped them 
achieve impressive comparative advantages in terms of the match of residual control 
rights and the right to residual benefits, the minimahzation of monitoring costs and 
moral hazards, and the provision of incentives compatible with institutional and market 
conditions in transitional China. The evolution of TVE ownership and governance 
structures will continue and will be increasingly influenced by international competition, 
but this should not imply that the fundamental features of TVE ownership and 
governance structures will disappear in the near future. The evolution of private 
enterprise in East Asia will also retain unique features and will continue to follow the 
path of mutual benefits, although private enterprises in East Asia may begin to resemble 
private firms in the West. 
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